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ABSTRACT 
Existing international frameworks that govern maritime interdiction entitle the 
boarding of a vessel in international waters only if justified by reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the vessel is engaged in illicit activity, a legal concept similar to the U.S. 
principle of “probable cause.” Given recent advances in radiation detection technology, 
this thesis considers how this concept could be strengthened by the use of detectors for 
maritime interdiction of illicit radioactive materials, a problem that spans both policy and 
technical issues. To address this problem, the thesis incorporates analysis of both legal 
and technical factors related to detection of illicit radioactive materials. It includes a 
comprehensive compilation and examination of the legal and institutional issues related 
to probable cause determination, as well as technical evaluations of a state-of-the-art 
remote radiation detection system known as the Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor 
(ARAM) to determine its suitability in supporting probable cause determinations in a 
maritime environment.  Based on these technical evaluations and an understanding of the 
legal and institutional issues related to probable cause determination, I conclude that 
radiation detection technology offers great promise in promoting effective interdiction 
operations that will improve safety and reduce the risk of illicit transport of radioactive 
materials. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The existing framework governing maritime interdictions, as established by 
international law, the Proliferation Security Initiative’s Statement of Interdiction 
Principles, and bilateral ship-boarding agreements, permits the boarding of a vessel only 
if such an action is justified by “such vague formulae as reasonable ground to suspect or 
good cause to believe that the vessel is engaged in illicit activity.”1 Similarly, United 
States law permits enforcement action, such as arrest or seizure, only under the 
prerequisite of probable cause, i.e., “a reasonable belief that a person has committed a 
crime.”2 This analogy between maritime law and homeland security can be further 
expanded. In policing highways, police patrols already have at their disposal portal 
radiation detection monitors in order to establish reasonable suspicion before stopping 
and searching a commercial vehicle suspected of carrying radioactive materials.3 Given 
the advances of such technology for further deployment onboard maritime platforms, the 
argument of this thesis is that establishing criteria for determining “probable cause” in 
maritime interdictions of illicit radioactive materials could be promoted on the same basis 
as in homeland security activities, which, at the international level, represents a unique 
overlap between policy and technical issues.  
Existing scholarship addressing these issues so far has generally fallen into two 
rather distinct categories and has remained confined within their respective fields of 
expertise. The first consists of social and political science literature, which is preoccupied 
with questions of legality and proper authority, while associating reasonable suspicion 
                                                 
1 Craig H. Allen, Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law (Westport, Conn: 
Praeger Security International, 2007), 65-66. 
2 Lectric Law Library's Lexicon, “Probable Cause,” Lectric Law Library, 
http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/p089.htm.  
3 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Science and Technology, “Detecting Radiation on the 
Move,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, https://www.llnl.gov/str/October05/Archer.html. 
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almost solely with intelligence,4 whether complemented or not by reconnaissance 
information.5 The second consists of physics literature, which focuses on radiation 
detection research, pure or applied, to cover the existing deficits in counter-proliferation 
operations. This thesis will combine the findings of both in an effort to answer the 
research question: how can a notion of “probable cause” be established for maritime 
interdictions involving illicit radioactive materials? 
B. IMPORTANCE  
The importance of establishing probable cause for maritime counter-proliferation 
operations is twofold: both macroscopic and microscopic. On a macroscopic level, since 
the early 1990’s and especially in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks, defense analysts, technical experts and international organizations (such as the 
International Atomic Energy Agency) have warned of the rising nuclear terrorist threat.6 
These concerns, in conjunction with the exposure of the A.Q. Khan network in early 
2004 that had sold nuclear-related technology and materials to North Korea, Libya, and 
Iran, were officially expressed on behalf of the world community on April 28, 2004, by 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540. This resolution stated that 
“[t]he proliferation of nuclear […] weapons, […] constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security.”7 Keeping in mind that the oceans make up more than 70% of the 
                                                 
4 Allen, Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law, 60; Andreas Persbo and Ian 
Davis, “Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the Law of the Sea,” 
British American Security Information Council Research Report 2 (2004): 37-9; Joel A. Doolin, “The 
Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm,” Naval War College Review 59, 
no. 2 (Spring, 2006): 29, 38; Mark R. Shulman, “The Proliferation Security Initiative As A New Paradigm 
For Peace And Security,” Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College (April 1, 2006), 16.  
5 Denise Hammick, “Navies endeavour to police the Mediterranean Sea,” Jane’s Navy International 
(July 1, 2007), 
http://www8.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jni/his
tory/jni2007/jni71286.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Navies. 
6 BBC news sec. Europe, “UN warns of nuclear terrorist threat,” BBC news, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1634464.stm; International Atomic Energy Agency and Europol, 
Combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material reference manual (Vienna: 
International Atomic Energy Agency, 2007), 3, http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/pub1309_web.pdf. 
7 United Nations, “Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1540, 2004, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html.  
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earth’s surface and that maritime trade accounts for almost 80% of world trade,8 as well 
as that in the Mediterranean Sea alone “there are around 7000 ships,” at any time9 the 
importance of maritime security in countering nuclear proliferation and terrorism is self-
evident. 
On a microscopic level, probable cause in maritime interdiction is a prerequisite 
for both normative and practical reasons. First, failure of the proclaimed cause (i.e., “if 
the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not 
committed any act justifying them”10) automatically means that "it shall be compensated 
for any loss or damage that may have been sustained.”11 Second, a complete lack of 
probable cause implies lack of legitimacy under international law. Third, keeping in mind 
the scarce numbers of warships compared to merchant vessels on a global scale,12 if an 
international actor should choose to disregard the established legal framework, “blind” 
interdictions which were not based on any prior surveillance, intelligence or radiation 
detection sensors would prove fruitless beyond any level of acceptable cost-effectiveness.  
As mentioned, the existing policy and legal framework associates probable cause 
with the vague enunciation of “reasonable ground to suspect or good cause to believe that 
a vessel is engaged in illicit activity.”13 This vagueness has in turn sparked debates 
among scholars and experts over the legal justification for maritime interdictions14 and 
how to set a threshold that demarcates a suspect from a non-suspect vessel.15 Since 
                                                 
8 Michael Richardson, A time bomb for global trade maritime-related terrorism in an age of weapons 
of mass destruction (Pasir Panjang, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), 3.  
9 Hammick, “Navies endeavour to police the Mediterranean Sea,” 2. 
10 United Nations, “Convention on the Law of the Sea,” Montego Bay: UNCLOS, 1982. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm (Right of visit, Article 110). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Allen, Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law, 62. 
13  Ibid., 65-66. 
14 Barry W. Coceano, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Challenges and Perceptions,” The 
Atlantic Council of the United States, Occasional Paper (May 2004), 15, 
http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=ISN&fileid=B98F0C0F-E2F7-8A69-831A-
EAC61CC732D0&lng=en. 
15 Allen defines it as the “quantum of suspicion necessary to justify PSI actions.” See Allen, Maritime 
Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law, 158.  
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thresholds are more easily set on raw numerical data than on intangible verbal concepts, 
this thesis will explore the potential of radiation detection technology developments for 
overcoming these probable cause issues beyond any legal interpretations, the credibility 
of intelligence and the subjectivity of commentators and scholars.  
One promising system that is currently being evaluated by authorities in the U.S. 
is the Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor (ARAM), developed by the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory and by Textron Systems. ARAM is an instrument with 
the potential to promote the valid and credible classification of a vessel as reasonably 
suspect beyond the easily debatable concepts of erratic behavior and credible intelligence. 
It offers real-time detection and identification of “radioactive materials as well as medical 
and industrial isotopes that may be used to make dirty bombs or radiological weapons.” It 
has also been designated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as “a 
Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology under the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering 
Effective Technologies Act (SAFETY Act),” and it can be deployed in a maritime 
version (known as an “ARAM RadBoat”).16 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Properly addressing this research question requires answers to a series of relevant 
sub-questions and problems. The first is, “What constitutes illicit nuclear or other 
radioactive material?”  The potential dual use of radioactivity for applications in both war 
and peace was acknowledged very early on. Several radioactive isotopes are being used 
for peaceful purposes in medicine, industry, agriculture and science. Nevertheless, they 
can easily be turned into Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs), also known as “dirty 
bombs.”17  
                                                 
16 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Safety Act, “Textron Systems Corporation.: Adaptable 
Radiation Area Monitor (ARAM)” (February 29, 2008), 
https://www.safetyact.gov/DHS/SActHome.nsf/Designations?ReadForm; Textron Systems, “Adaptable 
Radiation Area Monitor Designated as a Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology” (March 24, 2008), 
http://www.textronsystems.com/news/2008/03_24_08.htm. 
17 Abel J. Gonzalez, “Security of Radioactive Sources: The Evolving New International Dimensions,” 
IAEA Bulletin 43, no. 4 (2001), 39, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull434/article8.pdf;  International Atomic Energy 
Agency and Europol, Combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material reference 
manual, 3-6.  
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This potential dual use in turn poses the question, “When does transporting 
nuclear or other radioactive materials constitute an unlawful act?” When boarding a 
vessel transporting relevant cargo, the answer to this question draws a distinct line 
between a successful counter-proliferation operation and the disruption of legitimate 
shipping, which conspicuously violates “one of the key tenets of the law of the sea, 
freedom of navigation.”18 
Thereafter, the questions “Who constitutes the proper authority to interdict the 
materials in question?” and “What is the legitimate reach of this authority?” are 
addressed. The Law of the Sea divides the oceans into various domains (such as 
territorial, contiguous, and international waters) and attributes specific rights and 
obligations to concerned international actors (a vessel’s flag state, the coastal state, and 
the interdicting state). 
Finally, the question of how to justify probable cause is at the same time the 
foundation for and the cornerstone of every maritime interdiction. It is necessary for both 
the initiation and post facto justification of the operation to the international community. 
Approaches to approaches to resolving this problem include intelligence, activity 
monitoring of merchant vessels complemented by “hailing” procedures,19 and developing 
radiation detection technology for maritime platforms.20  
The on-demand development of radiation detection technology to meet post-
September 11, 2001 security needs focuses on several purely technical and practical 
issues. Merchant vessels present a particularly high level of difficulty in detecting 
radiation sources. First of all, they are moving platforms. Second, in sharp contrast to 
highways, global sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are not fixed. Consequently, no 
fixed control points exist. The concept of operations for these radiation detection 
monitors involves their deployment on small, usually rigid-hulled inflatable boats 
                                                 
18 Persbo and Davis, “Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the 
Law of the Sea,” 7. 
19 Roberto Cesaretti, “Combating terrorism in the Mediterranean.” NATO Review (Autumn 2005), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/art4.html. 
20 Textron Systems, “Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor Designated as a Qualified Anti-Terrorism 
Technology.” 
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(RHIBs) that conduct “passes” in close proximity to suspect vessels. However, although 
every major warship has an RHIB (or similar vessel) available, the huge size of most 
commercial ships and their complicated physical structure, comprised of multiple decks 
and bulkheads with a considerable amount of heavy machinery, increases the distance 
from and the shielding of any potential radioactive source. Moreover, due to the 
aforementioned dual use of isotopes in peaceful applications and to the omnipresence of 
significant (in terms of detectability) radiation in such innocent cargo as a load of 
bananas,21 the portable monitors need to have not only the ability to detect radiation but 
also to identify specific sources.  
Thus, in order to draw a measure of effectiveness for any maritime radiation area 
monitor, apart from an optimal speed of the “pass” by the suspect vessel, two theoretical 
concentric circles with the monitor as datum should be constructed for each tested source; 
an inner one representing the maximum range of both detection and credible 
identification, and an outer one representing the extreme limit of detection even with poor 
or no identification results. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The term “probable cause” is intimately connected with law enforcement in social 
science. However, as Hedley Bull points out, the existing order in world politics 
resembles more closely an “anarchical society,”22 a concept that is especially relevant for 
the greatest part of the world’s oceans, where no absolute and sovereign authority 
applies. A short-lived debate between John Selden, who advocated mare clausum, and 
Hugo Grotius, who advocated mare liberum, took place during the 17th century.23 The 
latter prevailed and became incorporated as the freedom of the high seas in the customary 
law of the sea. It was much later formalized within the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, Article 87). Thus, in policing highways legitimacy is 
                                                 
21 Ronald D. White, “Detectors may Cause Port Delays,” Los Angeles Times, May 7, 2005. 
22 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002). 
23 Natalie Klein, “Legal Limitations on Ensuring Australia’s Maritime Security,” Melbourne Journal 
of International Law 7, no. 2 (2006): 310.  
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axiomatic and only evidence of suspicion needs to be provided, in policing SLOCs 
justification of probable cause has to provide both reason for suspicion and legality under 
UNCLOS. These issues represent an area of debate among scholars, especially in terms 
of how they are addressed by such organizations and activities as the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI), NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), and the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, with the PSI receiving the lion’s share of 
attention. 
Despite the fact that the UNCLOS is largely perceived to be “the most 
comprehensive political and legislative work” ever created under the aegis of the United 
Nations,24 it is still, as is every piece of legislation, open to a fair amount of 
interpretation. As detailed in Yann-Huei Song’s study of commentators (including 
Benjamin Friedman, Devon Chaffee, Michael Byers, Andrea Persbo, Ian Davis and 
several others)25 on the question of PSI legality under UNCLOS, interpretation is in turn 
subject to different individual points of view, schools of thought, and interests advocated 
by various international actors. This has lead to a wide spectrum of ardent supporters, 
deprecatory critics, and irresolute or ambiguous commentators on the subject.  Song’s 
overall assessment leads to the conclusion that the PSI, as a system of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements based on consent, is in conformity with international law, with 
the caveat that the latter conclusion may not render legal every maritime interdiction 
undertaken by it in all circumstances. Each real or hypothetical scenario needs to be 
examined on a case-by-case basis, while in parallel focusing on the three major fields 
where the rights and obligations of the concerned parties may overlap with one another. 





                                                 
24 Yann-Huei Song, “The U.S.-Led Proliferation Security Initiative and UNCLOS: Legality, 
Implementation, and an Assessment,” Ocean Development and International Law 38, no. 1/2 (January 
2007): 102.  
25 Ibid., 113.  
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interdiction (i.e., territorial, contiguous, or international waters), and the flag under which 
the vessels in question sails,26 coinciding with the “what,” “when,” and “who” questions 
of this thesis. 
Song’s conclusion shares a great degree of consensus among scholars, as does the 
fact that in certain cases law can be interpreted in a wider context,. Thus, several legal 
clauses are put forth for justification of probable cause, when such justification falls short 
of the strict UNCLOS context. One such clause suggested by Allen is the customary law 
of unilateral self-help countermeasures.27 Though possibly unlawful under other 
conditions and restrained by the United Nations Charter, provisions on the use of force 
and self-help actions gain legitimacy if intended as a proportionate response to an 
ongoing or intended violation. After acknowledging Myres McDougal’s view that such 
countermeasures are appropriate due to the lack of a global sovereign authority,28 Allen 
argues that apart from UNCLOS Article 110, which clearly defines the cases when the 
right of visit applies in the high seas, Articles 25 and 221 connote self-help, stating that a 
“coastal state may resort to extrajudicial countermeasures” within and beyond its 
territorial waters by invoking respectively a non-innocent passage or pollution-related 
reasons. 
In a similar context, another debate among experts regards the prospect presented 
by PSI of creating rules of customary international law to justify boarding, instead of 
merely applying them. Song, based on the record of previous PSI activities, argues that 
this possibility is not likely to become a reality, due to the absence of “a general practice 
of states in undertaking interdictions.”29 On the other side, Doolin, expressing a more 
 
 
                                                 
26 Song, “The U.S.-Led Proliferation Security Initiative and UNCLOS: Legality, Implementation, and 
an Assessment,” 113-114.  
27 Allen, Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law, 135-138. 
28 Myres S. McDougal, “Authority to Use Force on the High Seas,” U.S. Naval War College 
International Law Studies 61 (1979): 551, 555 as cited in Allen, Maritime Counterproliferation Operations 
and the Rule of Law, 135. 
29 Song, “The U.S.-Led Proliferation Security Initiative and UNCLOS: Legality, Implementation, and 
an Assessment,” 134.  
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general expectation, claims that through the cluster of PSI agreements, exercises, and 
interdictions, boarding a vessel suspected of carrying WMD materials will gradually 
evolve into a widely accepted practice.30 
Yet another claim, mentioned but not advocated by Allen31 and Doolin,32 is that 
of belligerent status in the global war on terror. Doolin points out that a prerequisite for 
such an invocation would be “an enabling resolution or formal declaration of war by the 
[United States] Congress,” which, though applicable against a specific state, becomes 
irrelevant against a non-state actor. As a result, his overall assertion concludes that 
belligerent status should only be invoked in conventionally defined war scenarios.33  
A more realistic potential alternative, cited by Persbo and Davis34 and Allen35 is 
the doctrine of necessity. Attributed to Hugo Grotius,36 the doctrine of necessity justifies 
an otherwise unlawful action when “the existence of a state is in peril.”37 While Persbo 
and Davis, and Allen use two different examples of appeal to necessity, their deductions 
are quite similar. Allen refers to the motor vessel (M/V) Saiga case,38 in the aftermath of 
which he qualifies the necessity justification at the same time as “tempting” and “coming 
at cost” (cost in this case referring to both the need to international legal structure). On 
the other hand, Persbo and Davis cite the successful necessity implementation of the M/V 
Torrey Canyon case,39 which sets a legal precedent. Hence, in a hypothetical scenario 
where there is solid ground to believe that a WMD cargo is underway on the high seas, 
                                                 
30 Doolin, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm,” 50-51. 
31 Allen, Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law, 92. 
32 Doolin, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm,” 45. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Persbo and Davis, “Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the 
Law of the Sea,” 10, 78-81. 
35 Allen, Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law, 173-174, 187. 
36 Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace: De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, trans. Francis W. 
Kelsey (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962). 
37 Persbo and Davis, “Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the 
Law of the Sea,” 78. 
38 This case is described fully in Chapter III. 
39 This case is described fully in Chapter III. 
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PSI states could claim interdiction as the only course of action to protect themselves 
against a “grave and imminent peril.”40 Even so, given the failure and consequent 
discrediting of intelligence in the last Iraq war,41 Persbo and Davis regard such a course 
of action only as a last resort in exceptional cases. If, instead of the exception, the 
necessity justification became the rule, it would then constitute an abuse of right under 
international law.42 
Another doctrine also proposed by Persbo and Davis, Shulman, Coceano, Allen, 
and Doolin is that of “pre-emptive” or “anticipatory” self-defense based on Article 51 of 
the United Nations Charter. Doolin goes further in providing examples of such 
implementation in maritime interdiction operations, namely the Cuban Missile Crisis of 
1962, Operation Noah’s Ark by Israel in 2002, and the seizure of conventional weapons 
by Spain in 2003. It is noteworthy that none of these operations was judged illegal under 
international law.43 Nonetheless, the final lesson of each is that pre-emptive self-defense 
should be used again as a last resort option.44 For all that, Doolin concludes that “the 
remedy is amendment, not reinterpretation.”45  
Persbo and Davis, as early as 2004, suggested ways of strengthening legality in 
cases when UNCLOS does not permit maritime interdictions through the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). More 
specifically, they suggested amending the 1988 Convention on the Suppression of 
                                                 
40 Persbo and Davis, “Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the 
Law of the Sea,” 80. 
41 Ibid., 10, 80. Another report refers to: “[S]pectacularly bad intelligence prepared by the IC in the 
run-up to the war in Iraq.” See U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Report on Whether Public 
Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials were substantiated by Intelligence Information,” 
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Publications 110th Congress, 2nd Session (June 2008), 170, 
http://intelligence.senate.gov/080605/phase2a.pdf.  
42 Persbo and Davis, “Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the 
Law of the Sea,” 81. 
43 Doolin, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm,” 47. 
44 Persbo and Davis, “Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the 
Law of the Sea,” 89; Shulman, “The Proliferation Security Initiative As A New Paradigm For Peace And 
Security,” 27; Allen, Maritime counterproliferation operations and the rule of law, 138-140; Coceano, 
“The Proliferation Security Initiative: Challenges and Perceptions,” 15. 
45 Doolin, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm,” 46-48, 
50. 
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Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) by making radioactive 
material transport an “internationally recognized offence” and the adoption of a 
resolution which would grant states the de jure right of combating nuclear proliferation 
on the high seas similar to the already vested right of combating piracy and the slave 
trade.46 
Regarding legal limitations on maritime counter-proliferation operations, Natalie 
Klein, focusing more on the policy aspect, finds them to be “indicative of deficiencies in 
the very nature of the law of the sea.”47 Writing after the proposed SUA amendment had 
taken official form under Article 3bis of the 2005 SUA Protocol of Amendment48 (which 
still awaits ratification for entry into force49). Klein considers the protocol to be 
promoting the counter-proliferation initiatives as a legally binding instrument that is 
consistent with UNCLOS.50 She pinpoints as a main deficiency in both of these 
conventions the exclusive authority of the flag state on the high seas and advocates that a 
slight encroachment of this authority at the behest of maritime security so as to promote 
probable cause.51  
Apart from the debates surrounding legal justification, there is currently a wide 
degree of consensus that establishing reasonable suspicion to board a vessel at sea is 
based on intelligence and reconnaissance. This is attested to by scholars (Allen, Persbo 
and Davis, Doolin, and Shulman),52 military officials (Vice Admiral Italian Navy 
                                                 
46 Persbo and Davis, “Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the 
Law of the Sea,” 75. 
47 Klein, “Legal Limitations on Ensuring Australia’s Maritime Security,” 309.  
48 As cited in Allen, Maritime counterproliferation operations and the rule of law, 218-219. 
49 IMO website, “Summary of Status of Conventions,” as of March 31, 2008, http://www.imo.org/.  
50 IMO Legal Committee, “Report of the Legal Committee on the Work of Its Eighty-Eighth Session,” 
LEG 88/13, 88th sess, Agenda Item 13 (18 May 2004) [66]. as cited in Klein, “Legal Limitations on 
Ensuring Australia’s Maritime Security,” 329.  
51 Klein, “Legal Limitations on Ensuring Australia’s Maritime Security,” 337.  
52 According to Shulman: “How Does the PSI Work: Intelligence Sharing and Operational 
Cooperation.” See Shulman, “The Proliferation Security Initiative As A New Paradigm For Peace And 
Security,” 16. For other sources with similar context see Allen, Maritime counterproliferation operations 
and the rule of law, 60; Persbo and Davis, “Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security 
Initiative and the Law of the Sea,” 37-39; Doolin, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a 
New International Norm,” 29, 38. 
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Roberto Cesaretti, former commander of NATO Operation Active Endeavour,53 and Rear 
Admiral Richard Leaman, former Chief of Staff for NATO’s Maritime Component 
Command [CC-Mar] Naples and OAE ships’ commanding officers54),  and  most of all 
by the ongoing activities of NATO and PSI member states’ naval units.55 The latter rely 
on “hailing procedures” regarding merchant vessels transiting through their patrol areas 
(i.e., calling them on a VHF channel, asking questions about the ship’s identity, cargo 
and activity, and visually identifying them), mostly using their own helicopters and 
monitoring their movements for as long they remain within sensors range. This data is 
then evaluated and correlated with intelligence information. If a vessel presents an erratic 
behavior profile (e.g. zigzagging, lowering and raising its flag),56 if anything unusual 
appears during the “hailing procedure,”57 and/or if the vessel is classified as suspect 
based on intelligence, appropriate action may be taken for interdiction in compliance with 
the law of the sea and with the prior consent of the ships’ masters and flag states when a 
non-compliant boarding is not in conformity with international law.58 
While most social scientists, like Shulman, acknowledge the “difficulty of 
detecting or seizing such [nuclear] materials at sea,”59 they disregard the technical 
aspects of it and make the probable cause issue only one for “policymakers, soldiers, 
diplomats, and lawyers.”60 On the other hand, Commander Doolin, being from a naval 
background, takes a more operational approach. After stating that the existing legal 
framework does not justify probable cause to stop motor vessels on the high seas solely 
based on “what they are suspected of transporting,” he promotes the concept of 
                                                 
53 Cesaretti, “Combating terrorism in the Mediterranean.” 
54 Hammick, “Navies endeavour to police the Mediterranean Sea.” 
55 NATO Briefing, “Combating Terrorism at sea,” NATO E-Bookshop (July 2006), 3,       
http://www.nato.int/ebookshop/briefing/active_endeavour/active_endeavour2008-e.pdf . 
56 Doolin, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm,” 29. 
57 Cesaretti, “Combating terrorism in the Mediterranean.” 
58 Ibid.; U.S. Department of State. Proliferation Security Initiative, “Statement of Interdiction 
Principles,” http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/23764.htm.   
 
59 Shulman, “The Proliferation Security Initiative As A New Paradigm For Peace And Security,” 35. 
60 Ibid., 39; Coceano, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Challenges and Perceptions,” 18-19. 
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“mastering the factors of space, force and time.”61 This concept, in probable cause terms, 
calls for enhanced international intelligence gathering and sharing, and, though not going 
into technical details, for specially equipped “visit board search teams” (VBSST) to be 
used. The latter need, though not required for justifying boarding itself, is still relevant 
for establishing reasonable cause to seize the illicit material that may be hidden in the 
vastness of sealed containers and/or the ship’s compartments. Foremost, it implies the 
technical implications behind this special equipment, which are analogous to those 
discussed in this thesis.   
Finally, Warden, in his thesis on overcoming challenges to the PSI, stresses the 
“challenge of detecting, identifying and characterizing WMD.”62 In overcoming this 
challenge, he points out the significance of the research conducted by the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory and potential cooperation with industry. Such 
cooperation is viewed as essential in developing radiation detection capabilities for use 
onboard intercepted vessels63 and has already become a reality.64   
Probable cause can further be promoted with the use of radiation portal monitors 
in a way similar to the existing concept of operations at several U.S. ports, as described 
by Kevin McCabe, chief inspector for Customs and Border Protection at the port of 
Newark, New Jersey.65 Data from these monitors mounted on RHIBs and, potentially, on 
helicopters, should be “compared with the shipping manifest” as declared through the 
hailing procedure “in a process that usually takes only a few minutes”66 and does not 
significantly interfere with the merchant vessel’s movement (only steady course and 
relatively low speed is required instead of a “dead stop” during boarding).   
                                                 
61 Doolin, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm,” 38. 
62 Herbert N. Warden, “Overcoming Challenges to the Proliferation Security Initiative” (Master’s 
Thesis, NPS, September 2004), 70. 
63 Ibid., 76. 
64 Berkeley Nucleonics Corporation, “Radiation Portal,” Berkeley Nucleonics Corporation, 
http://www.berkeleynucleonics.com/radiationportal.html. 
65 White, “Detectors may Cause Port Delays.” 
66 Ibid. 
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In that direction, the much less controversial and less publicized Global Initiative 
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism may prove very constructive. According to Woolf, Kerr 
and Nikitin, although the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism faces 
constraints, such as lack of funding and consequent skepticism on behalf of U.S. 
Congress,67 it nonetheless constitutes a “flexible framework” which can  “prevent illicit 
trafficking by improving detection of such [nuclear] material.”68 This framework also 
includes common exercises and sharing of doctrines, operational information, and 
technology in expert-level workshops.69 This sharing of technology and expertise by 
scientists like Glenn F. Knoll,70 in such fields as the properties of crystalline sodium 
iodide scintillators (the core of the gamma detectors used by ARAM), presents the 
potential of promoting probable cause for maritime interdiction operations involving 
illicit radioactive materials. While avoiding the “dangerous” path of “bending 
international law,”71 the result of this cooperation should be, through credible and 
publicly available detection and identification data, achievement of the goal of reaching a 
global consensus on combating illicit nuclear trafficking at sea. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Due to the interdisciplinary nature of this thesis, a range of different approaches 
and methods will be used. The core of the legal/political aspect will be approached with a 
combination of case study and comparative analysis. The current legal framework as 
expressed by the UNCLOS, the SUA Convention, and its 2005 Protocol of Amendment, 
as well as by UNSC resolutions, will set the basis for a case study of actual maritime 
exercises, such as the PSI “Adriatic Gate 2007” and NATO’s “Phoenix Express 2008,” 
and real-world maritime interdictions, including those of the So San and the BBC China 
                                                 
67 Amy F. Woolf et al., “Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements,” 
CRS Report for Congress, RL33865 (2008), 34, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33865.pdf.   
68 Ibid. 
69 U.S. Department of State. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, “Terms of Reference for 
Implementation and Assessment,” http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/76421.htm. 
70 Glenn F. Knoll, Radiation Detection and Measurement (New York: Wiley, 2000). 
71 Coceano, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Challenges and Perceptions,” 15. 
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(described by U.S. officials as a successful interdiction under the PSI in October 200372), 
to show probable cause implementation in the field. The potential legal alternatives will 
be assessed in the same way, using cases that may set a precedent for future maritime 
counter-proliferation invocation (M/V Saiga and M/V Torrey Canyon cases). Sources 
used are to be found in both official documents of the U.S. government and NATO, as 
well as in relevant critiques of existing scholarship.  
Comparative analysis will evolve around the argument that the PSI is “an activity, 
not an organization,”73 unlike NATO. This approach has certain drawbacks, such as the 
lack of standing assets,74 but theoretically offers flexibility75 and does not preclude any 
further cooperation with standing organizations, including NATO itself.76 
To address the technical aspects of maritime interdiction of illicit nuclear material 
transportation, the ARAM system will be evaluated using the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) performance criteria for mobile and transportable radiation 
monitors employed for homeland security.77 In this part of the ARAM maritime 
application, data collected both in the lab and in the field will be used to evaluate how 
distance from the source, relative speed of pass between sensor and target vessels, source 
type, shielding, and background radiation level/noise affect the critical aspects of 
detection and identification. 
                                                 
72 Song, “The U.S.-Led Proliferation Security Initiative and UNCLOS: Legality, Implementation, and 
an Assessment,” 121.  
73 Ibid.,105.  
74 “The PSI seeks to use existing authorities -- national and international -- to defeat proliferation.” 
See U.S. Department of State. Proliferation Security Initiative, “What is the Proliferation Security 
Initiative?”  http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/34726.htm. 
 
75 Fabrice Pothier, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Towards a New Anti-Proliferation 
Consensus?” British American Security Information Council Research Report, Occasional Papers on 
International Security Policy (2004), http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/BN041118.htm#05.  
76 NATO Briefing, “Combating Terrorism at sea,” 3; Doolin, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: 
Cornerstone of a New International Norm,” 42-43. 
77 American National Standards Institute, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and IEEE 
Xplore. American National Standard Performance Criteria for Mobile and Transportable Radiation 
Monitors Used for Homeland Security (New York, NY: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 
2006),  http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/opac?punumber=4197202. 
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Finally, the thesis will offer findings and recommendations related to both 
political and technical aspects of dealing with the establishment of probable cause in 
maritime interdiction operations of illicit nuclear/radioactive materials. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
In order to set out a logical sequence, this thesis will follow the scheme of 
questions as set out in the Problems and Hypotheses section. The first question to be 
addressed is: “What constitutes illicit nuclear or radioactive material?” Next, the current 
legal framework as expressed by the UNCLOS, the SUA Convention and its 2005 
Protocol of Amendment, as well as UNSC resolutions will be examined in order to 
answer the questions: “When does transporting nuclear or radioactive materials constitute 
an unlawful act, who constitutes proper authority to interdict the materials in question?” 
and “What is the legitimate breadth of this authority’s reach?” Shifting from theory to 
practice, existing approaches on how to justify probable cause by the PSI and NATO will 
be analyzed via exercises and interdictions undertaken so far, followed by another 
theoretical analysis of potential legal alternatives.  
Next, the ARAM system will be examined as a specific technical approach to 
detection and identification of radioactive materials. This technology will be evaluated by 
thorough analysis of lab and field data towards the goal of potentially enhancing probable 
cause. Last, keeping in mind both legal and technical considerations, a final conclusion 
will be elaborated followed by feasible recommendations.  







II. EXISTING FRAMEWORK – FACTS, INTERPRETATION 
AND IMPLEMENTATION 
A. WHAT CONSTITUTES ILLICIT NUCLEAR OR OTHER RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIAL? 
In order to answer this question, the potential threats posed by the materials in 
question must be identified. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), these “threats involve criminals or terrorists acquiring and using for malicious 
purposes: 
(a) nuclear explosive devices; 
(b) nuclear material to build an improvised nuclear explosive device (IND); 
(c) radioactive material to construct a radiological dispersal device (RDD); and/or 
(d) the dispersal of radioactivity through sabotage of installations in which 
nuclear and other radioactive material can be found or of such material in transport.”78  
These potential threats cover a wide range of radioactive materials involved, 
which need to be further categorized. In terms of risk assessment, the IAEA makes at first 
the distinction between nuclear and other radioactive materials.79 Materials categorized 
as “nuclear” are those which under certain conditions may be used for the fabrication of a 
nuclear explosive device, and are further divided into special fissile or source materials. 
The technical difference between them lies in the fact that special fissile materials are 
artificially processed, whereas source materials are naturally occurring. Hence 
plutonium-239 (239Pu) is a by-product of nuclear spent fuel, while the uranium isotope 
235 (235U) must pass through an enrichment process in order to be upgraded to special 
fissile status. In contrast, source materials are comprised mainly of naturally occurring 
materials such as 238U and thorium-232 (232Th).80 
                                                 
78 IAEA, Combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material reference manual, 3. 
79 Ibid., 6. 
80 Ibid., 7. 
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Nuclear materials evidently present the highest threat to global security due to 
their ability to produce catastrophic nuclear explosions. Precisely because of this ability, 
very strict regulations have been imposed on their production and handling. In addition to 
the fact that the fissile core of a nuclear weapon is the most costly and difficult to acquire 
of its components, the whole assembly procedure of such a lethal device requires a 
sophisticated infrastructure and a very high level of expertise.81 Nevertheless, the mere 
acknowledgement of such difficulties is not adequate to render the respective threat 
completely irrelevant. As Allen comments, the internationally accepted minimal 
requirement to produce a nuclear explosive device is, depending on the fissile material, 8 
kg of plutonium or 25 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Experts do not regard the 
prospect of a lower-yield weapon with as little as half that fissile mass as technically 
infeasible.82 The prospect of a lower-yield device provides another possible avenue to 
potential proliferators or terrorists as they seek to overcome the obstacles represented by 
high-technology requirements, since – though unanticipated and problematic as it may 
seem – relevant plans have managed to escape the classified realm and become publicly 
available.83 For this reason, a small quantity of illicit nuclear material, weighing just a 
few kilograms and the size of a baseball (given the extremely high density of such 
elements), poses an extremely high and real threat. In addition, as acknowledged by the 
IAEA, apart from ordinary nuclear explosive devices, special fissile materials may be 
also used for improvised ones. In this respect, HEU would, more likely than plutonium, 
be used for an IND, despite the fact that a greater quantity of HEU would be needed.84 
This last attribute makes HEU even more attractive for terrorists and increases the 
likelihood of its illicit trafficking. 
At this point, it is important to note that the radiation detection capabilities of 
portal monitors should be complemented with identification capabilities for all the 
aforementioned special nuclear materials (SNMs), although not limited to them. As will 
                                                 
81 Allen, Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law, 19. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid.  
84 Ibid. 
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be explained further in Chapter IV, portal monitors use spectroscopic identification 
techniques for gamma radiation. As scientific research has shown, “legal shipments of 
radioisotopes could be used to mask the presence of illicit nuclear materials.”85 In 
addition to the performance limitations of the scintillators used, the presence of another 
source of gamma radiation may interfere with the identification algorithms of the 
monitor, thus masking co-existing special nuclear materials.   More specifically, data 
indicates that the widely used industrial isotopes of cesium-137 (137Cs) and barium-133 
(133Ba) can effectively mask “low detection levels of HEU and WGPu”86 (weapons grade 
plutonium), respectively. 
This points to a critical aspect of potentially illicit radioactive materials: their 
dual-use nature. SNMs can undoubtedly be used as either nuclear reactor fuel or as the 
fissile material for a nuclear explosive device. Therefore, given the strict regulatory 
controls to which these materials are subject, if intercepted without being properly 
registered to the ship’s manifest, they are automatically classified as illicit. This is not, 
however, the case for the wide range of other radioactive sources with widespread 
peaceful and commercially available applications, such as medicine and industry.87 These 
materials, although not capable of sustaining a chain reaction (a prerequisite for 
producing a nuclear explosion) can be used in RDDs, commonly known as dirty bombs. 
In this case, no sophisticated techniques are required. Conventional explosives (such as 
TNT) or even non-explosive means can be used for the dissemination of radioactive 
particles over a dispersal area can be used, with a radius proportionate to the means.88 
Regarding this threat, though, there have been some exaggerated scenarios presented in 
the media. Official sources, among them Abel J. Gonzalez, director of the IAEA Division 
of Radiation and Waste Safety, estimate that civilian injuries and significant 
contamination “would be limited” and restricted to a small area, “possibly a few city 
                                                 
85 M.I. Reinhard, et al., “Detection of Illicit Nuclear Materials Masked with other Gamma-Ray 
Emitters,” Nuclear Science Symposium Conference Record IEEE 1 (October 29-November 1, 2006): 270-
272.  
86 T. Saunders, “Spectroscopic portal identification of special nuclear materials,” Nuclear Science 
Symposium Conference Record IEEE 2 (October 26-November 3, 2007): 1209-1211. 
87 Gonzalez, “Security of Radioactive Sources: The Evolving New International Dimensions,” 41. 
88 IAEA, Combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material reference manual, 5. 
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blocks.”89 Nevertheless, the effects of dirty bombs should not be neglected nor 
underestimated, since they would arguably inflict “much terror and psychological 
distress.”90 
Therefore, shipments of medical or industrial isotopes should be regarded as 
potentially illicit and, if detected, should be thoroughly examined both in terms of 
regulatory control/manifestation, as well as physical storage: manifestation, in order to 
minimize the prospect of being used for criminal or unauthorized acts and physical 
storage, in order to uncover propensity to mask SNMs. 
Last, naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) such as potassium-40 
(40K), which is largely used in agriculture as a fertilizer91 and exists abundantly in a great 
variety of natural substances, such as bananas, or even the human body itself,92 should 
not in any case be regarded as illicit radioactive material. For all of the reasons detailed 
above, the need for proper identification, in addition to detection, of all types of 
radioactive materials (SNM, medical, industrial, and NORM) is self-evident.   
B. WHEN DOES TRANSPORTING NUCLEAR OR OTHER RADIOACTIVE 
MATERIALS CONSTITUTE AN UNLAWFUL ACT? 
Despite the profound effects on a global scale of the atomic bombardment in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the fear of a nuclear holocaust under which the world has 
lived since, there is still no clause in international law that explicitly bans the use of 
nuclear weapons in armed conflict93 or renders their transport illicit. However, there have 
been several efforts to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons, mainly in the form of 
multinational treaties, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered 
                                                 
89 Gonzalez, “Security of Radioactive Sources: The Evolving New International Dimensions,” 39. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Argonne National Laboratory, “Potassium-40,” Human Health Fact Sheet (August 2005), 
http://www.ead.anl.gov/pub/doc/potassium.pdf. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Allen, Maritime Counterproliferation Operations and the Rule of Law, 18. 
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into force in 1970.94 Under this treaty, which counts 189 state-parties (i.e., all recognized 
sovereign states with the exception of India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea), only the 
United States, Russia, France, China and the United Kingdom are entitled to produce and 
possess nuclear arms temporarily (until eventual nuclear disarmament occurs), with all 
other signatories agreeing to refrain from acquiring such arms forever. Moreover, under 
Article I of the NPT, these nuclear weapon states undertake “not to transfer to any 
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over 
such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, 
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices.”95  
Therefore, under the existing framework, only the five officially recognized 
nuclear weapon states and the four non-party states to the NPT can legally transport 
nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, other substances including nuclear reactor fuel, as well as 
spent or reprocessed fuel also fall within the category of nuclear materials, but in this 
case they can be transported without onerous legal restrictions based on the inherent right 
of every state in peaceful or energy-related nuclear applications. (In the case of the non-
nuclear weapon states party to the NPT, this would only require compliance with the 
safeguards provided for by Article III of the treaty in question and implemented by 
IAEA.) 
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, as well as North Korea’s withdrawal 
from the NPT on January 10, 2003,96 pointed out two major weaknesses of the NPT: its 
failure to address provisions for non-state actors and its inferior binding force in relation 
to the rule of conventional or customary international law.  In that direction and 
following an evolutionary process, a series of UNSC resolutions was passed. Resolution 
1368 on September 12, 2001, came as a response to non-state actors’ terrorist threats and 
                                                 
94 United Nations, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Status of Multilateral Arms 
Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf.  
95 Ibid. 
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under it the UNSC decided “to remain seized of the matter.” 97 Resolution 1373 noted 
“with concern the close connection between international terrorism […] and illegal 
movement of nuclear […] and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard 
emphasizes the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional 
and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge 
and threat to international security.”98 The climax came on April 28, 2004, with UNSC 
Resolution 1540, which was unanimously adopted and is binding on all states.99 
“Recognizing that most States have undertaken binding legal obligations under treaties to 
which they are parties,” and “gravely concerned by the threat of illicit trafficking in 
nuclear … and related materials,” Resolution 1540 focuses attention on non-state actors. 
It urges all states to take prompt action toward preventing WMD proliferation as well as 
establishing strict domestic controls and legislation in that direction. Resolution 1540, 
though a significant step forward, limits itself to actions and jurisdiction that abide within 
the existing legal framework and is not intended to alter it. It falls short of recognizing as 
an offense the unlawful transportation of radioactive materials. It also depends on states 
to implement its decisions and does not provide any clause for “unilateral enforcement 
measures,”100 such as maritime interdictions, in case of a state’s failure to comply. 
This state-based authority for the implementation of the relevant treaties and 
regulations regarding radioactive materials is not only limited to the territorial landmass, 
waters, and airspace, but also all vessels sailing on the high seas under a state’s flag. 
Thus, the case of a vessel at sea while engaged in illicit trafficking of radioactive 
materials, raises the issue of who holds proper criminal jurisdiction over her and her 
cargo. 
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C. WHO CONSTITUTES PROPER AUTHORITY TO INTERDICT THE 
MATERIALS IN QUESTION? WHAT IS THE LEGITIMATE REACH OF 
THIS AUTHORITY? 
In attempting to answer these questions, Devon Chaffee’s observation that “there 
is nothing in the LOS that explicitly prohibits transit of WMD or gives states rights to 
interdict such transit” serves as a useful starting point.101 However, a more accurate 
answer requires closer consideration of three factors: the cargo type of the interdicted 
ship, the maritime zone of the interdiction, and the flag under which the vessels in 
question sails.102 
UNCLOS divides the seas into several maritime zones, in which issues of 
jurisdiction generally comply with the following empirical rule: their complexity index is 
directly proportional to the distance from the coastline.103  The first one of these zones is 
made up of internal waters (i.e. ports, mouths of rivers and small bays). Any coastal state 
enjoys full and absolute jurisdiction within its internal waters. Thus, it has the right to 
stop, board, and search any vessel, regardless of flag of registration, and even proceed to 
the seizure of any illicit radioactive materials found. In this case, probable cause criteria 
do not fall under the law of the sea, but under a state’s own national legislation.104 
Further away from the coast, the seas are demarcated into territorial waters, 
contiguous waters, exclusive economic zones, and the high seas, as shown in Figures 1 
and 2 (NM standing for nautical miles).  
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Figure 1.   Maritime Zones.105 
Within its territorial waters, a coastal state still exercises its sovereignty rights, 
although its jurisdiction is somewhat limited due to the right of innocent passage given to 
foreign-flagged vessels. The right of innocent passage is recognized by all states, coastal 
or land-locked, by both conventional106 and customary law;107 thus adherence to it is 
required for both signatories and non-signatories of the UNCLOS. In order for this rule to 
apply, the passage must be “continuous and expeditious,”108 in addition to not being 
“prejudicial to the piece, good order or security of the coastal state.”109 Moreover, Article 
23 of UNCLOS provides further amplification for the case of “ships carrying nuclear or 
other inherently dangerous or noxious substances,” stating that they should “carry 
documents and observe special precautionary measures established for such ships by 
                                                 
105 Source: Royal Australian Navy. “The Navy Contribution to Australian Maritime Operations: RAN 
Doctrine 2 – 2005.” Royal Australian Navy Publications (June 21, 2005) 
http://www.navy.gov.au/w/images/NCAMO_Book.pdf. 
106 UNCLOS, Article 17. 
107 Persbo and Davis, “Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the 
Law of the Sea,” 55. 
108 UNCLOS, Article 18. 
109 UNCLOS, Article 19. 
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international agreements” when exercising the right of innocent passage through the 
territorial sea. Thus, a literal application of the law of the sea leaves the coastal state with 
no legal standpoint to justify an interdiction of the suspected ship. Given also that the flag 
state’s exclusive jurisdiction cannot be exercised within the territorial waters of another 
state, the only appropriate course of action would be a boarding by the coastal state with 
the consent of the flag state.  
 
Figure 2.   Side view of maritime zones with respect to ocean floor morphology.110 
 
                                                 
110 Source: Frances B. Michaelis, “International Year of the Oceans-1998 Australia's policies, 
programs and legislation,” Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary Library Research Paper 6 (December 8, 
1998) http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/1998-99/99rp06.htm.  
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Nevertheless, among the specific preconditions described in Article 19 of 
UNCLOS, which would render a passage as non-innocent, is “any threat or use of force 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, 
or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations.” This provision could provide grounds for a coastal state 
to interdict a passing foreign-flagged vessel transporting radioactive materials, based on 
the claim that such passage is not innocent. This argument could be further supported by 
Article 21 and a “liberal interpretation”111 of Article 25. Article 21 specifically grants a 
coastal state the right to adopt laws and regulations applying to vessels conducting 
innocent passage and regarding the “prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, 
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State,” while under Article 25, 
the coastal state may “suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the 
innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its 
security.” Clearly, there is still a substantial degree of controversy regarding interdiction 
of illicit radioactive materials being transported through territorial waters, with both sides 
having credible arguments to support their case. 
The right of innocent passage can be viewed merely as a component of the 
freedom of navigation, which is the governing principle of the oceans: the more distant 
from shore, the more difficult it becomes to contest this principle for conducting maritime 
interdiction operations. The semantic differential between territorial waters and the rest of 
the maritime zones that extend beyond it is that the latter ensemble is regarded, in purely 
navigational terms, as international waters.112 According to Article 31 of UNCLOS, in 
the adjacent-to-the-territorial sea contiguous zone, the coastal state may only exercise the 
control necessary to “prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary 
laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea” or to “punish infringement of 
the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.” More 
simply put, any foreign-flagged vessel merely transiting through a coastal state’s 
                                                 
111 Song, “The U.S.-Led Proliferation Security Initiative and UNCLOS: Legality, Implementation, 
and an Assessment,” 117. 
112 Ibid. 
 27
contiguous zone may not be interdicted by that or any other state (except the one under 
which it is registered), regardless of the nature of her cargo.  Customs laws and other 
regulations may provide a qualifying reason for boarding only if the vessel in question 
has just left or intends to enter the territorial waters of the coastal state. 
However, under Article 56 of UNCLOS, the coastal state enjoys within its 
exclusive economic zone sovereign rights only for the “purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing […] natural resources.” Under the same article, in 
exercising these rights the coastal state shall “have due regard to the rights and duties of 
other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.” 
Once more, the most prominent of the rights that other states enjoy is that established 
under Article 87, the right of freedom of navigation. Unless a vessel transporting 
radioactive materials acts in infringement of environmental protection laws, any potential 
interdiction would constitute a disruption of legitimate shipping. In other words, the 
exclusive economic zone is intended to ensure the coastal state’s rights in exploiting its 
adjacent oceans and not in any case policing them.  
Last, the high seas encompass the whole body of the oceans that lie beyond all 
previously mentioned maritime zones. The high seas are open to all states, whether 
coastal or land-locked,113 and no state enjoys any form of sovereign rights.114 Most 
important, ships sailing on the high seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
flag state, “save in exceptional cases.”115 These cases are exhaustively described in 
Article 110 under the right of visit, or simply put, the right to board a vessel. Hence, 
boarding on the high seas is legally justified if, and only if, there is “reasonable ground 
for suspecting that: 
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy; 
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade; 
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the 
warship has jurisdiction under article 109; 
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(d) the ship is without nationality; or 
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, 
of the same nationality as the warship.”116  
Despite the fact that Article 110 does not grant states the de jure right of 
combating nuclear proliferation on the high seas similar to the already-vested right of 
combating piracy, it still presents some ground for interdicting radioactive materials, 
which are limited to cases of stateless or dubious nationality vessels or environmental 
safety violations. In these cases, as in any of the aforementioned issues regarding the 
territorial, contiguous, or exclusive economic zones, though the legal status of any 
pretence used will remain ambivalent and an issue of dispute by concerned parties, what 
needs to be established at first is reasonable ground for suspecting an illicit activity, in 
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III. HOW TO JUSTIFY PROBABLE CAUSE? EXISTING 
APPROACHES AND POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES 
A. EXISTING APPROACHES (PEACETIME RIGHT OF APPROACH AND 
VISIT – CONSENT OF THE FLAG NATION) 
1. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
a. Origins 
The PSI is a U.S.-led initiative announced by President Bush during a 
speech in Poland in May 2003, just before the G-8 summit. Along with the general 
concern for promoting the non-proliferation regime, the PSI was largely intended to 
counter a “weakness” in international law that was exposed by an incident in December 
2002. After an intelligence tip by U.S. services that had classified a vessel as suspect, the 
Spanish authorities had seized 15 Scud missiles that had been found onboard the So San, 
a North Korean freighter. What would have been a great non-proliferation success ended 
up as a fiasco since the Spanish authorities did not have the “de jure” right to confiscate 
the cargo nor to detain the transporting ship, which was eventually released.117 In a 
speech announcing the PSI, President Bush said, “when weapons of mass destruction or 
their components are in transit, we must have the means and authority to seize them,” a 
statement very likely to have been inspired by this incident.118 Moreover, despite the fact 
that UNSC Resolution 1540, calling on all states to take cooperative action to prevent 
trafficking in WMD, was passed almost a year after the announcement of the PSI, it is 
officially regarded by the U.S. as “a positive way to take such cooperative action.”119 
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b. Statement of Interdiction Principles 
What is more important, though, is that the PSI identifies interdiction as a 
focal point of its strategy.120 Hence, the core of the initiative lies in the Statement of 
Interdiction Principles, adopted in the third PSI meeting, held in Paris, on September 4, 
2003. Prior to the principles themselves, three facts/claims need to be pointed out in the 
respective text: the first is that PSI supports previous efforts of international community 
in countering WMD proliferation, “including existing treaties and regimes.”121 Second, 
the PSI is intended to permit the interdiction of WMD and related materials “flowing to 
or from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.” Third, such interdictions 
will be “consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and 
frameworks.” As for the principles themselves, they can be summarized as calling on 
participating and all other concerned states to: 
(i) interdict WMD and related materials being transported to and from  states 
and non-state actors of proliferation concern 
(ii) adopt streamlined procedures for sharing information about relevant 
trafficking 
(iii) strengthen national legal authority in order to accomplish the 
aforementioned goals, as well as working with other states to also strengthen 
relevant international law and frameworks 
(iv) take specific actions in support of the interdiction in question and 
consistent to national and international laws.122  
Apart from making use of their peacetime right to approach and visit, 
Principle IV relates specifically to partners making use of flag-state exclusive jurisdiction 
in their internal/territorial waters and on the high seas, as well as providing consent 
“under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag 
vessels by other states.”123 
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It is understood that the PSI does not impose any formal obligations on 
participating states.124 In the words of the chairman of the second meeting, held in 
Brisbane, Australia, it reflects “collective political commitment,”125 empowered in the 
field of maritime interdictions by the embodiment of its participating states’ sovereign 
rights.126  
c. Bilateral Ship-Boarding Agreements 
When sovereign rights are not sufficient to justify the right of visit under 
the preconditions of the law of the sea, the consent of the flag state, whether a PSI 
participant or not, must be sought to provide proper legal cause. In this context, and in 
order to facilitate or accelerate the whole process of granting consent,127 the U.S., as the 
leading PSI partner, has initiated the practice of signing bilateral ship-boarding 
agreements, especially with leading nations in terms of their ships’ registries. Despite the 
fact that as few as six core PSI partners make up for almost 12 percent of the global ships 
registry,128 this figure is still unacceptable in risk management terms, since even one 
vessel transporting illicit radioactive materials can inflict significant casualties and 
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the U.S. has signed bilateral agreements with Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, 
Marshall Islands, Mongolia and Panama,129 which add up to the accessible shipments of 
more than 60 percent of the world’s tonnage.130  
d. Intelligence 
In the new security environment that emerged after the September 11, 
2001, attacks, intelligence has been correctly acknowledged as the “first line of 
defense.”131 A series of specific reasons make intelligence indispensable to maritime 
interdiction operations, not only limited to the aforementioned vastness of the oceans.  
First of all, especially during the early years of the initiative, there was an inadequate 
maritime surveillance infrastructure to deal with new developments. Based on Cold War 
standards intended only to monitor the relatively small number of an adversary’s 
warships, ocean surveillance lagged behind in terms of similarly monitoring the large 
number of commercial vessels at sea.132 Additional considerations which make 
surveillance of commercial shipping even more substantially difficult, also included the 
owner of the vessel, her cargo, and most importantly, the consigner and the recipient of 
that cargo. Given the dual-use nature of radioactive materials, the actual and not the 
“declared” origin and destination of such cargo needed to be known, in order for them to 
be properly identified with states or non-state actors of proliferation concern. Considering 
further the notion of illicit radioactive materials being transported while undeclared in a 
ship’s manifest, intelligence became even more crucial. Even today, it is not an 
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tankers in particular, their cargo can change ownership while in transit up to seven 
times.133 This being the case, without an allocated shadowing unit for each vessel, it 
becomes virtually impossible to keep accurate track of commercial shipping.  
For all these reasons, intelligence has been identified by PSI as a primary 
means of classifying vessels as “reasonably suspected of carrying [WMD] cargoes” and 
the adoption of streamlined procedures for intelligence exchange as one of PSI’s formally 
enumerated interdiction principles.134 Nevertheless, overreliance on intelligence or using 
poor intelligence for establishing probable cause in maritime interdictions can also be 
counterproductive. As Allen points out, “intrusive interdictions based on intelligence that 
ultimately proves faulty will tend to erode public confidence in the program [PSI] and 
may shake the resolve of other PSI participating states.”135 Moreover, intelligence, 
regardless of source (HUMINT, SIGINT, or IMINT),136 is not only limited by data-
gathering considerations, but also by inherent restrictions for sharing it. Keeping in mind 
that even within NATO, a treaty-based, long-lived, and consolidated alliance, intelligence 
sharing is conducted “on a limited, selective basis,” mostly in the form of “processed 
intelligence, rather than raw data.”137 It is evident that in such a loosely connected 
“activity” as the PSI an even greater reluctance to share relevant information would 
apply.  
e. Exercises 
Beyond issues related to credible information gathering and sharing, 
another concern is the need for the integration of this intelligence with the command, 
control and communications structures of the PSI participants, and afterwards, to test this 
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integration.138 Until now, at least 30 exercises have been conducted on a worldwide scale 
(involving more than 70 nations) by PSI member states,139 most of them in a maritime 
environment,140 which appears to be the initiative’s focus since its conception. Table 1 
summarizes these PSI exercises. 
Participation in exercises is not limited to the military and may also 
include assets from the coast guard and other related law enforcement agencies such as 
the customs or intelligence services. Neither are these exercises bound by the geographic 
context posed by the sovereign limits of the host nation. They are usually multinational in 
nature and include the active participation of several countries, whether contiguous or 
not, and are observed by the representatives of many others.141 The goal of these 
exercises is to “increase interoperability, improve interdiction decision-making processes, 
and enhance the interdiction capacities and readiness of all participating states.”142 
Clearly, probable cause is one of the key issues addressed by these PSI exercises, since 
both reason/evidence of suspicion and legality under UNCLOS lie within the framework 
set by “interdiction decision-making processes.” Probable cause is further enhanced by 
the PSI Operational Experts Group (OEG), drawing from across the spectrum of involved 
fields (military, law enforcement, intelligence, legal, and diplomatic). During their 
meetings, participants strive to “develop operational concepts, organize the interdiction 
exercise program, share information about national legal authorities, and pursue 
cooperation with key industry sectors.”143 
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Table 1.   Proliferation Security Initiative Maritime Interdiction Exercises 
Sept. 10-13, 2003  Exercise PACIFIC PROTECTOR: Australian-led maritime exercise conducted in the Coral Sea. 
Oct. 13-17, 2003  Exercise SANSO '03: Spanish-led maritime exercise conducted in the Western Mediterranean. 
Nov. 25-27, 2003  
 
Exercise BASILIC '03: French-led maritime exercise conducted in the Western 
Mediterranean. 
Jan. 11-17, 2004  
 
Exercise SEA SABER: U.S.-led maritime exercise conducted in the Arabian Sea, 
United States. 
Apr. 19-22, 2004  
 
Exercise CLEVER SENTINEL: Italian-led maritime exercise conducted in the 
Mediterranean. 
Oct. 25-27, 2004  Exercise TEAM SAMURAI '04: Japanese-led maritime interdiction exercise. 
Nov. 8-18, 2004  Exercise CHOKEPOINT '04: U.S.-led maritime interdiction exercise. 
Apr. 8-15, 2005  Exercise NINFA '05: Portuguese-led maritime/ground interdiction exercise. 
Aug. 15-19, 2005  Exercise DEEP SABRE: Singaporean-led maritime/ground interdiction exercise. 
Nov. 14-19, 2005 Exercise EXPLORING THEMIS: UK-hosted maritime/Command Post Exercise 
(CPX)144 interdiction exercise. 
Apr. 4-5, 2006  Exercise TOP PORT: Dutch-hosted maritime / CPX interdiction exercise. 
May 24-26, 2006  Exercise ANATOLIAN SUN: Turkish-hosted combined air, land and sea CPX and 
LIVEX interdiction exercise. 
Sept. 13-15, 2006  Exercise AMBER SUNRISE: Polish-hosted maritime/ground exercise with 
participation by Denmark, Russia, and Sweden. 
Oct. 10-31, 2006  Exercise LEADING EDGE: U.S.-hosted CPX and maritime/ground interdiction 
exercise (Persian Gulf). 
May 27-29, 2007  Exercise ADRIATIC GATE: Slovenian-hosted ground/port interdiction exercise. 
June 18-22, 2007  
 
PSI Gaming Exercise: U.S.-hosted exercise at the Naval War College, Newport, 
Rhode Island. 
Aug. 29-Sept. 7, 
2007 
Exercise PANAMAX 07: U.S.-hosted maritime PSI scenario.  
Oct. 12-15, 2007 Exercise Pacific Shield 07: Japanese-hosted PSI maritime/port interdiction exercise. 
Oct. 29-31, 2007 Exercise Eastern Shield 07: Ukrainian-hosted combined air, ground, and sea 
interdiction exercise with participation from Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, Moldova, 
and Poland. 
Mar. 10-12, 2008 Exercise Guistir 08: Djiboutian- and French-hosted maritime / port interdiction 
exercise (Key participants: Red Sea and Maghreb countries.) 
Apr. 8-22, 2008 Exercise Phoenix Express 08: U.S.-led maritime interoperability exercise in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Maritime interdiction PSI scenario included. 
May 12-14, 2008 Exercise Adriatic Shield 08: Croatian-hosted maritime / port interdiction exercise. 
(Key participants: Adriatic Sea countries, Poland, and the U.S.) 
Source: “Calendar of Events,” U.S. State Department, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c12684.htm, last accessed 
August 1, 2008. 
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Two of the most recent PSI maritime exercises were “Adriatic Gate 2007” 
and “Pacific Shield 07,” hosted by Slovenia and Japan, respectively. In the first, the 
concept of operations consisted of “stopping, searching and securing of container with 
‘dirty bomb’-related materials in the port of Koper.”145 Apart from the hosting nation and 
observers from 40 different countries,146 participants included Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Croatia, and the U.S., the latter providing expertise on the detection of 
materials in question.  
On the other hand, “Pacific Shield 07” involved ten vessels and four 
aircraft from Australia, France, Britain, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore, and the United 
States training in the interdiction of vessels transporting WMD-related materials both in 
port and at sea. More specifically, the series of events included search, detection, and 
tracking the suspect vessel at sea, boarding procedures, on-board search and detection of 
WMD-related materials, as well as in-port cargo inspection.147   
These scenarios, taking place in the internal waters of a PSI participant, 
support the claim that PSI activities are in compliance with international and national 
legal requirements,148 while the at-sea boardings demonstrate to potential traffickers both 
readiness and resolve to proceed in high seas interdictions, when UNCLOS requirements 
are fulfilled.  
f. Maritime Interdictions 
No matter how sophisticated the exercises, or how useful the operational 
doctrines they produce, the very word ‘scenario’ implies parameters that are controllable 
to a large extent. Thus, such exercises are nearly always “successful” in ways that cannot 
be disputed. 
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On the other hand, real world interdiction operations and their results are 
rarely publicized, due to the delicate and usually classified nature of the 
intelligence/operational information involved. It true, though, that some of them have 
been carried out since 2003, as the engineer behind the PSI and then-U.S. Under-
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton has 
acknowledged.149 The most prominent PSI inderdiction cited by U.S. officials as being 
successful was the BBC China incident of October 2003.150 The vessel was flying a 
German flag and was owned by a German shipping company. Its last port of call was 
Dubai and its declared destination was a Libyan port,; it was sailing in the Red Sea 
carrying as part of its cargo centrifuge equipment: i.e., nuclear weapons-related 
technology for the uranium enrichment process. This information had come to the 
knowledge of U.S. and UK intelligence services and, as part of PSI intelligence sharing, 
was made available to German authorities. The latter, through the ship-owner, ordered 
the ship to divert to Taranto, Italy immediately after it entered the Mediterranean Sea 
through the Suez Canal.  There, it was thoroughly searched by Italian authorities, who 
seized the five containers of the illegal cargo (not declared in the ships manifest).151 
Despite the fact that this incident did not directly involve radioactive materials, it 
included every other aspect of a successful and legitimate probable cause establishment, 
and subsequent interdiction. Reason for suspicion was established by what proved to be 
credible intelligence. Since the ship was sailing on the high seas, legitimacy of action was 
sought through the consent of the flag state and, as soon as the latter was granted, 
interdiction took place in the internal waters of a PSI state, where existing national 
legislation and manifest improprieties classified the cargo as illicit, and therefore subject 
to confiscation.  
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Also noteworthy is the So San incident of December 9, 2002, before the 
establishment of the PSI. Again, the suspect cargo did not include radioactive materials, 
but instead Scud missiles. Nevertheless, in terms of the legal framework, the same 
conditions apply and clearly demonstrate the strict context that the law of the sea pertains 
to the right of approach and visit on the high seas. Initial suspicion was provided by 
intelligence (money transfers and satellite imagery), but was further complemented by 
surveillance provided by the Spanish frigates Patino and Navarra, patrolling the Arabian 
Gulf, as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.152 The ship had left the North Korean port 
of Nampo, heading to Yemen. Adding to initial suspicions, surveillance indicated that the 
vessel was following a zig-zag course, and most importantly, kept lowering and raising 
its flag.153 Whereas the first factor merely indicates unusual conduct (since commercial 
ships typically follow a fixed track corresponding to the shortest route), the second is a 
violation of UNCLOS Article 92,154 giving reasonable grounds to suspect that the vessel 
was without nationality. Hence the right of approach and visit as described under 
UNCLOS Article 110 could be invoked.  
Under the customary law of the sea, implementation of the right of 
approach and visit includes several discrete phases.  First, the warship establishes 
communication with the suspect vessel and requests identification data, including its 
name, flag, port of registry, cargo, and last and next port of call. If the provided data 
cannot be verified, the warship has the right of investigation: i.e., to send an officer-led 
team to inspect the official documents of the merchant ship or to order the ship’s master 
to have these documents presented aboard the warship.  If there is any remaining 
suspicion, the warship has the right to board and search the vessel. The last phase, 
coinciding with the right of seizure, is only applicable if the findings of the search 
provide evidence that the vessel is actually engaged in one of the illicit activities 
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encompassed under the law of the sea.155 If this is not the case, and “suspicions prove to 
be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not committed any act justifying 
them,” UNCLOS Article 110 provides that the ship “shall be compensated for any loss or 
damage that may have been sustained.”     
In the case of So San, the above procedure was followed to the letter. 
During initial radio contact, the master claimed that his vessel was registered under 
Cambodian flag and was transporting cement to Yemen. Communication with the 
Cambodian authorities disproved this claim, so the Navarra proceeded to the boarding 
and search of the vessel. The search revealed 15 Scud missiles that the North Korean 
government had sold to its Yemeni counterpart, and which were not declared in the ship’s 
manifest. As is the case with radioactive materials, the transport of missiles between 
states does not constitute an illicit act on the high seas and right of seizure could not be 
implemented; the So San was eventually allowed to proceed to its destination.156 
Probable cause for maritime interdiction had been lawfully established, but the existing 
framework fell short in justifying seizure.    
2. NATO Operation Active Endeavour 
a. Origins 
The previous incidents, though excellent examples of interdictions, are not 
unique in recent maritime history, nor can PSI participants claim exclusiveness in 
conducting such operations. It has a NATO counterpart, namely “Operation Active 
Endeavour.” In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United States called 
for the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, a request that was 
unanimously accepted by its allies. On October 4, 2001, the allies decided to take on 
eight initial measures, one of which involved the deployment of Standard Naval Force 
Mediterranean SNFM (now Standing NRF Maritime Group 2 (SNMG-2) “to provide a 
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deterrent presence and surveillance in strategic international waters at a key moment.”157 
The initial deployment of SNFM in Eastern Mediterranean was given the name 
“Operation Active Endeavour” (OAE) on October 16, 2001, and in the next months, 
provided valuable operational experience.  
b.  Operations, Intelligence and Surveillance 
In due time however, Active Endeavour’s mission expanded, both in scope 
and geographic coverage. Initially the main task of NATO’s naval units was to “hail” 
merchant vessels transiting their patrolling areas (i.e., to call them on a VHF channel, ask 
questions about the ships’ identity, cargo, and activity, visually identify them, and 
monitor their movement for as long they were in sensor range). In other words, NATO’s 
activities were limited to the right of approach. This information was then related to CC-
MAR Naples, Italy and NATO’s shipping center in Northwood, UK. In April 2003 the 
mission was modified to include compliant boarding operations on suspect vessels, 
“compliant” in this case meaning with the prior consent of the ships’ masters and flag 
states, which gives the boarding full legitimacy under international law. In the case of a 
suspect classified M/V or of anything unusual or suspicious during the “hailing” 
procedure, the ship may be boarded to inspect documentation and cargo under the new 
doctrine, but only if “it is the most sensible course of action.”158 Otherwise, the ship is 
“shadowed until action is taken by a responsible agency”159 or it reaches a country’s 
territorial waters where the authorities of the next port of call are asked to inspect it. In 
the case that consent is not given for a compliant boarding, NATO will take any further 
action required for the vessel to be inspected at the next legitimate opportunity (in the 
territorial waters of a NATO member state).160 As a general case, then, maritime 
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interdictions undertaken by OAE are in full compliance with the law of the sea, based 
either on the consent of the flag-state in international waters or the absolute jurisdiction 
of NATO member-states in their internal waters.  
Since October 2004, an additional operational pattern has been adopted. 
Collected surveillance and intelligence data have been correlated in order not only to 
clarify suspect vessels at the request of patrolling units, but also to generate a list of 
specific vessels of interest. As a result, these vessels of interest may be continuously 
monitored by available means and specific NATO assets may be assigned to track or 
board them if necessary.161 
Operation Active Endeavour’s success and increased efficacy in the East 
Mediterranean led to expansion of its geographic area of operations to include the entire 
Mediterranean Sea, as of March 2004. A measure of its success is found in the following 
figures; as of 13 July 2006, 81,000 ships had been hailed and 102 suspect vessels had 
been boarded.162 In addition, another measure of increased efficacy is that, in a sea where 
at any time “there are around 7,000 ships,” the Maritime Operations Centre (MOC) at 
CC-Mar Naples is in position to regularly track 6,000 vessels simultaneously, based on 
data from all currently available resources (deployed naval units, land-based Maritime 
Patrol Aircrafts (MPAs) and coastal radar positions).163  
Nevertheless, the existing doctrines and monitoring system are not 
infallible, as demonstrated by an event not directly related to Active Endeavour. On 
March 23, 2007, a 15-member boarding party from the HMS Cornwall that had been 
inspecting a merchant dhow in the Arabian Gulf was captured by the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard. As a result of this unprecedented incident, the NATO MIO 
boarding doctrine is under revision in order to encompass new precepts being developed 
by the Royal Navy.164   
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This ongoing doctrinal review falls under NATO’s continual efforts to 
build MIO expertise, especially since the establishment in 2004 of the NATO Maritime 
Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC). The NMIOTC is located on the 
Souda Bay Naval BAse in Crete, Greece (one of the two principal bases used for Active 
Endeavour ships, along with Aksaz, Turkey). It has as its main mission to provide 
“realistic and flexible training in major fields that may include the boarding process, 
special operations, WMD, CBRN, damage control, navigation in restricted areas, MIO 
planning, maritime law enforcement, international organizations, international law/human 
rights and international terrorism” for NATO allies and partners.165 The combination of 
knowledge provided in these fields demonstrates NATO’s commitment to providing 
expertise in probable cause-related issues, not only to the higher ranks of the chain of 
command, but to the actual implementors of a maritime interdiction decision-making 
process.  
c. Exercises  
NATO’s commitment to expertise is further demonstrated by relevant 
exercises such as “Phoenix Express 2008.” Phoenix Express is an annually held exercise 
that is specifically focused on the “conduct of maritime interdiction operations (MIO) and 
visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) operations.”166 It has two phases: the first 
includes theoretical and practical training ashore at the NMIOTC and the second is 
conducted at sea with real-life simulation scenarios.  More specifically, participants from 
Algeria, Greece, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and the U.S. have 
conducted in total 23 boarding scenarios, using helicopters or RHIBs.167   
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d. Maritime Interdictions  
Similarly to the PSI, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) attributes a high 
specific weight to intelligence and its sharing among NATO members and Mediterranean 
Dialogue partners. According to its Commanding Officer, Vice Admiral (Italian Navy) 
Roberto Cesaretti, the ultimate goal for the operation is to advance information 
collection, analysis, and sharing to a level where it is capable of shifting OAE status from 
“intelligence-supported to intelligence-driven.”168 Nevertheless, even the existing OAE 
status resulted in the successful interdiction of the Baltic Sky in June 2003. This vessel 
had been acting in a suspicious manner for almost a two-month period before finally 
being intercepted. It had left Albania on April 22, 2003, and was sailing under a Comoros 
flag when it arrived in Gabes, Tunisia, on May 12. In Tunisia, it loaded up its cargo, 
supposedly be bound for Sudan. However, nine days later it was spotted by Turkish 
authorities in the Dardanelles. From May 22 until June 1, it was monitored sailing in the 
Mediterranean without making any port. On June 2, it arrived in Istanbul where it stayed 
for only one day, and then it sailed again through the Aegean archipelago, entering Greek 
territorial waters in the Ionian Sea on June 18.169  The fact that the ship had been 
suspiciously wandering in the waters adjacent to Greece and Turkey, although allegedly 
delivering its cargo to Sudan, attracted the attention of CC-MAR Naples which then took 
action by disseminating this information to either NATO or national authorities.170 As a 
result, the Baltic Sky was put under close surveillance by the Greek Coast Guard for the 
next five days. On June 22, it was subsequently boarded and searched by Greek 
authorities, which found in its cargo 680 tonnes of explosives and 8,000 detonators. It 
was also discovered that the alleged recipient in Sudan was a non-existent company.   
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An overall assessment of the Baltic Sky interdiction in probable cause 
terms qualifies it as legal under the law of the sea. First, it was concluded for “security 
reasons”171 in the territorial waters of the boarding state; second, the ship, though flying a 
Comoros flag, was actually registered in the Marshall Islands; and third, the vessel was 
found not to be in possesion of the proper documents.172 
e. NATO and the PSI 
The PSI, being “an activity, not an organization,”173 lacks permanent 
establishments such as an MOC or NMIOTC. This has certain drawbacks, such as 
depriving it of standing assets; however, it allegedly offers flexibility and does not 
preclude further cooperation with standing organizations, even NATO itself. On the 
contrary, during the Istanbul summit of June 2004 the allies declared their “strong 
support” for the PSI and have also evaluated Operation Active Endeavour as being 
“highly relevant in this context.”174 
B. POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES 
Existing approaches to establishing probable cause for maritime interdictions of 
illicit radioactive materials are strictly limited – within the framework of the law of the 
sea – to the provision of consent by the flag state on the high seas or to sovereign 
jurisdiction of the coastal state in its own internal and territorial waters. However, due to 
the great menace that radioactive materials pose in the wrong hands, there have been 
proposals to strengthen these interdictions by either implementing multilaterally binding 
decisions and agreements or by unilateral enforcement actions justified on the 
reinterpretation of existing law. 
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1. 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) 
The SUA Convention is a treaty signed under the aegis of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) in the aftermath of the cruise ship the Achille Lauro’s 
hijacking.175 Since the illegal acts committed during the incident were for political and 
not private ends, the standards set by the definition of piracy176 could not be satisfied. At 
the request of several countries, the SUA Convention was put forward by the IMO 
Assembly in order to “ensure that appropriate action is taken against persons committing 
unlawful acts against ships. These include the seizure of ships by force; acts of violence 
against persons on board ships; and the placing of devices on board a ship which are 
likely to destroy or damage it.”177 The convention was opened for signature on March 10, 
1988 and entered into force on March 1, 1992.178 
In a similar way to the Achille Lauro incident, the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001, initiated a procedure of redefining the list of unlawful acts, as well as going one 
step further: establishing procedures for exercising jurisdiction over them.179 The 
procedure for the proposed amendment of the convention began on April 2002, during 
the eighty-fourth session of the IMO Legal Committee. The intent from the beginning 
was to criminalize, under certain conditions, the transport of WMD and related materials 
at sea and to incorporate boarding provisions when such a crime is committed. The Final 
Act was signed more than three years later on October 14, 2005, after a conference that, 
in the words of the IMO Secretary General Mr Efthimios E. Mitropoulos, was the “most 
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politically charged” in IMO history.180  This was because on one side, states like the U.S. 
advocated for fewer restrictions concerning the boarding of one state-party ship by 
officials of another state-party, whereas others were concerned about “the potential lack 
of compatibility between the proposed boarding procedures and the principles of freedom 
of navigation and the flag state jurisdiction.”181  
The protocol, recalling UNSC Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which reflect 
international will to combat terrorism, and Resolution 1540 which aims to prevent 
nuclear proliferation,  addresses the issue of probable cause in maritime interdictions of 
illicit radioactive materials in two proposed articles, 3bis and 8bis.182  
Article 3bis states that any person commits an offense within the meaning of the 
SUA Convention if that person unlawfully and intentionally transports on board a ship: 
(i) any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that it is intended to be 
used to cause, or in a threat to cause, with or without a condition, as is 
provided for under national law, death or serious injury or damage for the 
purpose of intimidating a population, or compelling a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act; or 
(ii) any BCN weapon, knowing it to be a BCN weapon as defined in 
article 1; or 
(iii) any source material, special fissionable material, or equipment or 
material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or 
production of special fissionable material, knowing that it is intended to be 
used in a nuclear explosive activity or in any other nuclear activity not 
under safeguards pursuant to an IAEA comprehensive safeguards 
agreement; or 
(iv) any equipment, materials or software or related technology that 
significantly contributes to the design, manufacture or delivery of a BCN 
weapon, with the intention that it will be used for such purpose.183 
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An exemption is made if the materials are being transported to or from states 
which are party to the NPT and under the condition that such transport is not contrary to 
that state’s obligations under that treaty.  Moreover, Article 11bis provides that none of 
the offenses defined in article 3bis should be considered as “political … or … inspired by 
political motives” (the claim that led to the exclusion of the offenses committed on board 
the Achille Lauro from being identified as acts of piracy). However, what leaves ground 
for potential interpretation or dispute is the question of “intent.”184  Since intention is a 
precondition for characterizing the transport of radioactive materials as an offense, then 
apart from establishing a reason for suspicion that these materials are actually being 
transported, evidence must also be presented that the transporter (whether the shipping 
company, the ship’s master, the crew, or whoever) was aware of both the malicious end-
use and end-user. This condition, if the protocol enters into force, might considerably 
impede probable cause establishment.185   
In response to the offenses described in Article 3bis, the 2005 SUA Protocol also 
specifies the procedural framework by which boarding may take place to “prevent and 
suppress”186 these offenses. Any request by a state-party to board a vessel of another 
state-party (from here, the flag state) must be in accordance with international law.187 
The requesting state may request consent to board only under the prerequisite of 
“reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship or a person on board the ship has been, is or 
is about to be involved in the commission of an offence,” and provided that the ship is 
sailing outside the territorial waters of any state.188  
In doing so it must also provide, if possible, “the name, the IMO ship 
identification number, the port of registry, the ports of origin and destination, and any 
other relevant information” concerning the suspect vessel.189 This information coincides 
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with data collected by NATO warships as part of “hailing” procedures and, to a more 
general extent, with information collected by all warships when exercising the right of 
approach. It is also noteworthy that the protocol does not explicitly refer to providing the 
actual reason for suspicion, much less evidence to prove the suspicion. However, even if 
the flag state chooses to authorize the boarding of one of its vessels, it retains the right to 
set forth conditions for doing so, “including obtaining additional information from the 
requesting Party.”190 Thus, on one hand, the flag state does not abrogate its sovereignty 
rights without legal justification and proof, and on the other, the need on the behalf of the 
requesting state arises for evidence of sources that can be relatively “publishable” and not 
as sensitive as intelligence. 
Going back to the actual process, the requesting party must first ask for 
verification of the ship’s declared nationality. If the vessel is properly registered, the 
requesting state may ask not only to stop, board, and search the ship, but also to question 
her crew for verification of the suspected offenses.191  In such a case, the flag state, apart 
from the obvious option of rejecting the demand, may choose to board the vessel by its 
own authority, provide consent, or opt for a combined action with the requesting state. In 
parallel, it can impose any conditions it deems appropriate. In any case, the flag state 
should respond to the request “as expeditiously as possible,”192 a requirement that 
imposes no specific time constraint on the flag state.193   
In order to facilitate the consent-granting procedures, the protocol sets forth two 
more options for the flag state: to provide a priori consent to all requests, by notifying the 
secretary-general of IMO upon accession to the treaty, or, by notifying the secretary-
general of IMO and rendering consent as automatically granted if no response is provided 
by its part “within four hours of acknowledgement of receipt of a request to confirm 
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nationality.”194 Still, these procedures for a priori, or express, authorization are optional 
and even if relevant notifications are made to the secretary-general of IMO, they can be 
revoked at any time. 
Finally, after the boarding and search have taken place, the flag state is to be 
promptly informed of any findings. Even if evidence of unlawful acts is discovered, the 
flag state retains exclusive jurisdiction over the ship, cargo, and crew, and it remains at its 
discretion whether to delegate this jurisdiction to the requesting state for issues of 
seizures and arrests.195  
Still, as Klein points out, an obvious omission of the 2005 SUA Protocol is the 
complete absence of any specific obligations imposed on the flag state to undertake 
positive action in respect to a ship under its registry, reasonably suspected of being 
engaged in an unlawful act.196  
As of June 30, 2008, only four states, corresponding to 5.09% of world tonnage, 
have ratified the protocol,197 which will enter into force 90 days after the date on which 
12 states have ratified it.198 In an overall assessment, the 2005 SUA Protocol, if entered 
into force, will be a positive step in terms of implementing probable cause for maritime 
interdictions of illicit nuclear materials by specifying when the transport of related 
materials is illicit. Nonetheless, it does not foretell any radical innovation in existing legal 
framework. During the negotiating sessions, as one report notes, “it was accepted that the 
principle of flag state jurisdiction must be respected to the utmost extent.”199 This, along 
with other provisions, qualifies the protocol as being in total conformity with existing law 
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of the sea. Moreover, from a purely legal perspective, the protocol has only the status of a 
multilateral treaty, binding only on those states which have ratified it. While the claim is 
that a multilateral treaty may be conceived as “reflecting, or as crystallizing, received or 
at least emergent rules of customary international law,” the protocol won’t be considered 
as binding on non-party states of proliferation concern200 and thus cannot be universally 
invoked for establishment of probable cause.  
2. Enhancement through a New UNSC Resolution  
Another alternative that would definitely overcome any obstacles for legal 
justification of probable cause in international waters is a new UNSC resolution. First, 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC may authorize the use of enforcement 
actions (such as maritime interdictions) against any perceived threat to international 
peace and security. Second, under Article 25 of the UN Charter, its decisions are legally 
binding on all states regardless. With the proposed resolution, the UNSC would decide 
that the illicit trafficking of radioactive materials, or in a more generalized sense WMD, 
constitutes an unlawful act of universal jurisdiction,201 a status currently shared on the 
high seas only by piracy, the slave trade and unauthorized broadcasting.202  
The prospects and potential benefits of such a resolution clearly have not escaped 
the attention of the involved actors. On the contrary, Resolution 1540 was initially 
intended by the U.S. and the UK as a tool that would explicitly extend the jurisdiction, on 
the high seas, of states to interdict vessels suspected of transporting WMD-related 
materials.203 However, the concerns of other states about abrogating the exclusive flag 
state jurisdiction, as well as potential harassment of legitimate shipping and abuse of 
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right,204 led to a compromise205 at the behest of the freedom of navigation. Thus, any 
future resolution seeking to add legitimacy to policing the oceans against the proliferation 
of WMD will have to carefully balance mare liberum with maritime security in order, 
first, to be approved by the UNSC206 and, then, to be received with the same widespread 
consensus as the provisions of existing international law on combating piracy and slave 
trade.  
3. The War on Terrorism and the Belligerent Status Claim  
Regarding potential alternatives to promote maritime security, both the 2005 SUA 
Protocol and the proposed UNSC resolution share the common characteristic of seeking 
to amend the existing legal framework by achieving consensus at the political level. Since 
consensus has proved barely attainable in terms of interdicting WMD-related materials at 
sea, scholars and experts have put forth other options that are based not on amendment, 
but reinterpretation of existing positive or customary international law. One of those is 
the war on terrorism and the belligerent status claim. 
According to the law of neutrality, belligerents enjoy during war the right to 
search and visit not only vessels of the enemy, but also neutral merchant vessels under 
certain conditions. The interdiction must take place outside neutral waters (i.e. outside the 
territorial waters of any third party to the conflict state) and the cargo must be ultimately 
destined to the enemy and “susceptible for use in armed conflict.”207 Clearly, fissile, and, 
to a certain extent, other radioactive materials could fall within the latter category.  
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As Doolin remarks, belligerent status has been viewed as relevant to the war on 
terrorism in operations such as “Iraqi Freedom” and “Enduring Freedom.”208 
Nevertheless, invoking belligerent status for broader in context operations, like those 
undertaken by PSI or NATO would signify the prerequisite of a UNSC resolution. Even 
if a country like the U.S. chose a similar course of action for unilateral operations, it 
would face practical restrictions. Declarations of war are traditionally issued by states 
against states. Hence, in targeting Al-Qaida’s potential host states, the U.S. would be 
obliged to declare war against at least eleven countries.209 Given these discrepancies, the 
belligerent status claim does not seem applicable for promoting maritime interdictions of 
radioactive materials.  
4. The Doctrine of Self-Help 
The doctrine of self-help was a widely accepted component of customary law 
until the end of World War II, entitling a state to protect its rights against a violation by 
another state, using all means that it deemed as appropriate.210 However, the introduction 
of the UN Charter in 1945 significantly curtailed the spectrum of these appropriate 
means, declaring that all states shall “refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force … in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations.”211 As a result, and in order to codify self-help in the newly formed world order, 
the International Law Commission (ILC), during its first session in 1949, identified the 
“responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts” as an issue of priority.212 More 
than half a century later, the current state of affairs is the one established by the fifty-third 
session, in 2001, which adopted a final set of 59 draft articles on Responsibility of States 
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for Internationally Wrongful Acts,213 and which invited world governments “to submit 
their written comments on any future action regarding the articles.”214 It is clear that the 
self-help doctrine is a highly controversial political and legal issue. 
Nevertheless, Allen asserts that the existing framework could provide grounds for 
maritime interdictions. After acknowledging Myres McDougal’s view that such 
countermeasures are appropriate due to the lack of a global sovereign authority,215 Allen 
argues that, although restricted in use of force terms by the UN Charter, the right of non-
forcible self-help “has not been extinguished.”216 Under the ILC Draft Articles on state 
responsibility, an injured state may take countermeasures against a state that is 
responsible for an internationally wrongful act, proportionate to the injury suffered and to 
the gravity of the internationally wrongful act.217 Moreover, trying to clarify the 
distinction between forcible and non-forcible countermeasures, Allen classifies policing 
of the oceans as non-forcible.   
Given these points, Allen associates self-help with UNCLOS. Apart from 
UNCLOS Article 110, which clearly defines the cases in which the right of visit applies 
on the high seas, Articles 25 and 221 connote self-help, stating that a “coastal state may 
resort to extrajudicial countermeasures” within and beyond its territorial waters by 
invoking either a non-innocent passage or pollution-related reasons.218 
Beyond that, any attempt to justify with the self-help doctrine a maritime 
interdiction on the grounds of a flag state’s failure to comply with its obligations under 
UNSC Resolution 1540 would be cumbersome. The primary reason is that nowhere in the 
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original text of the resolution is it written or implied that a flag state’s failure to “adopt 
and enforce appropriate effective laws”219 for the prohibition of WMD transport or to 
provide consent for boarding by a third-party state constitutes an internationally wrongful 
act. On the contrary, due to the recorded objections of some UNSC members regarding 
alteration of the existing maritime interdictions regime, as well as due to the explicit 
decision to remain seized on the matter, the Security Council reserves for itself the 
authority for further interpretation or action under this resolution.220 
Generally, the assertion that self-help countermeasures provide ground for legally 
justifying probable cause in maritime counter-proliferation operations, could easily be 
countered with the argument that this ground is not solid, since it should only be seen in 
conjunction with the greater specific weight carried by the relevant provisions of 
UNCLOS and UNSC resolutions. Thus, the existing legal status of self-help cannot 
significantly contribute to establishing probable cause for boarding a foreign flagged 
vessel.  
5. The Doctrine of Necessity 
A more realistic potential alternative is the doctrine of necessity. Attributed 
originally to Hugo Grotius,221 the doctrine of necessity justifies an otherwise unlawful 
action when “the very existence of a state is in peril.”222 With that main precondition, 
necessity “supersedes all laws,”223 when it is actual and not simply discerned, and when 
all other available means for the state in question to preserve its existence have been 
exhausted. The M/V Torrey Canyon case set a legal precedent by which necessity can be 
successfully implemented even if its main precondition is not met. On March 18, 1967, 
the tanker Torrey Canyon run aground on a reef off the coast of Cornwall, United 
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Kingdom. The oil slick caused by her cargo of 100,000 tons of crude oil inflicted a great 
environmental catastrophe on the marine life of southwestern England and northwestern 
France. After all other attempts to minimize these disastrous effects had failed, the British 
Royal Air Force and Navy bombed the Torrey Canyon in an effort to sink it and burn off 
its remaining oil cargo. The ship was owned by a U.S. company, registered under a 
Liberian flag and sailed by an Italian master, so, in order to legally justify bombing, the 
UK invoked the doctrine of necessity.224 A retrospective examination of the incident by 
the International Law Commission assessed that, although the existence of the appealing 
state was not in peril, if the shipping company had tried to make use of its ownership 
rights to prevent the destruction of the vessel, the UK’s action “would have had to be 
recognized as internationally lawful because of a state of necessity.”225 
In this respect, the International Law Commission has also included a revision of 
necessity in Article 25 of the aforementioned draft articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts. This revision includes the following provisions:  
I. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation 
of that State unless the act:  
(i) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a 
grave and imminent peril; and 
(ii) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States 
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II. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for 
precluding wrongfulness if:  
(i) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of 
invoking necessity; or 
(ii) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.226 
This definition of necessity has been similarly applied by the International 
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea during its verdict for the M/V Saiga case.227 On October 
28, 1997, the tanker Saiga and its crew were detained on the high seas of the mid-Atlantic 
Ocean by Guinean authorities and under the probable cause that the vessel was “involved 
in re-fuelling (bunkering) fishing vessels at sea within the Exclusive Economic Zone of 
Guinea.”228 Due to the fact that the vessel was registered under Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines flag and the interdiction was undertaken on the high seas, Guinea invoked the 
doctrine of necessity for legal justification of its actions. However, the international 
Tribunal on the Law of the Sea decided that “Guinea had not demonstrated that its 
essential interests were in grave and imminent peril, nor that extending its customs laws 
to the EEZ was the only means of safeguarding those interests,”229 thus rendering 
necessity inapplicable in this case. 
The question that arises is if in a hypothetical scenario, where there is solid 
ground to believe that illicit radioactive materials are underway on the high seas, a state 
other than the flag state could claim interdiction as the only course of action to protect 
itself against a “grave and imminent peril.”230 Nuclear materials definitively constitute a 
grave and imminent peril, even more so if their final recipient is a non-state terrorist 
organization. The peril should also be considered as extending not only to the concerned 
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state, but also to the global community as a whole.231 Moreover, if previous attempts to 
obtain consent for boarding from the flag state have failed or if any other reasons 
qualifying for the right of visit are not applicable, then, given the strict context of relevant 
international law, an interdiction justified on the doctrine of necessity is clearly the last 
and only means available of safeguarding a state’s security.232  
Nevertheless, the primary hypothesis on which this scenario was based is not 
foolproof: intelligence must be of a high enough quality to merit an unassailable decision 
to board. First, the discrediting of intelligence in the current Iraq war233 will most likely 
raise the standards of the international community and institutions in post-justifying an 
otherwise unlawful intervention, such as boarding a foreign vessel. In any case, the 
source of information or intelligence will have to be revealed, a condition with which the 
intelligence services of any state will be reluctant to comply.234 Furthermore, the dual-
use nature of radioactive materials will make it even more difficult to identify their real 
end-user, increasing the possibility of actually disrupting legitimate shipping.235  
Last, but not least, the infringement of freedom of navigation by a state’s 
unilateral action invoking necessity, will most likely initiate a chain reaction of similar 
interdictions by other states and potentially malevolently intended against the first state’s 
interests. Such a prospect will erode the foundations of the international legal structure 
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beyond any remedy.236 It is in the interest of all states to take such a course of action only 
as a last resort and in exceptional cases. If, instead of the exception, the necessity 
justification became the rule, it would then constitute an abuse of right under 
international law.237 
6. The Doctrine of Pre-Emptive or Anticipatory Self-Defense 
Similar to self-help and necessity, self-defense is another traditional notion of 
international law, which grants a state the right to take up action against an aggressor. 
This action may also include the use of force, but it must be limited to measures 
necessary and proportionate to the aggression. The contemporary framework for these 
limits of self-defense is set by the UN Charter, which is again more restrictive in context 
compared to pre-World War II notions and practices.238 Article 51 justifies self-defense 
only in the case of an actual armed attack, and only “until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” It is evident and 
beyond any interpretation that the bar for invoking self-defense in maritime interdiction 
operations is as a result set very high, whereas the notions of pre-emption or anticipation 
are not officially recognized attributes of self-defense.  
There have been exceptions to this rule, with the Caroline incident setting the 
historical landmark. On December 29, 1837, British forces attacked the steamboat SS 
Caroline in the Great Lakes region. The ship was suspected of transporting arms and 
personnel in support of a Canadian rebellion to overthrow British rule, and the UK 
invoked a claim of anticipatory self-defense to justify the action. This incident has since 
then been used to set the defining principles of anticipatory self-defense, which the 
British failed to fulfill and which are considered to be: i) response to actual or threatened 
violence; ii) necessity; and iii) proportionality.239   
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Obviously, the semantic differential is established by justifying response not only 
to actual, but also to threatened violence. Despite the fact that this clause seems to be 
eradicated by the UN Charter, there has still been some remaining inertia regarding its 
use. Though the U.S. has never formally invoked Article 51, Doolin cites the Cuban 
Missile Crisis of 1962 as highly relevant to the application of pre-emptive self-defense in 
maritime interdictions of nuclear weapons. The maritime interdiction operations during 
the crisis were formally undertaken with reference to the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance, commonly known as the Rio Pact.240 This pact incorporates 
collective security/defense provisions for the American Continent/Western Hemisphere, 
which are also in conformity with Article 51 of the UN Charter.241 Action taken by the 
U.S. under these articles was justified since, despite the fact that the issue was brought up 
to the UNSC, no measures necessary to maintain international peace and security were 
decided by the latter. Moreover, Doolin argues that the principles of necessity and 
proportionality were respected. The operation had the character of a “defensive 
quarantine” along “prescribed” sea lines of communication to Cuba and at a “reasonable 
distance” from it. The use of force was minimal, in contrast with other forms of action, 
such as sinking suspect vessels, as well as the disruption of legitimate shipping and 
freedom of navigation.242 Last, he points out that these interdictions are cited as “a valid 
precedent.”243  Even Doolin himself, however, does not characterize them as legal, but as 
“consistent with U.S. responsibilities under the UN Charter.”244 
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Two other examples of anticipatory self-defense are attributed to Israel. The first 
is Operation “Noah’s Ark,” carried out on January 3, 2002, after months of intelligence 
activity.245 On this day, the 4000-ton merchant vessel Karine-A was interdicted by Israeli 
authorities in the international waters of the Red Sea, between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 
and almost 300 nautical miles away from the nearest port of the Israeli coast, the port of 
Eilat.246 After the onboard search, over 50 tons of arms and ammunition were discovered, 
allegedly intended for the Palestinian Authority (PA). According to Lloyd’s List, a journal 
that tracks global shipping records, the vessel has been recently renamed and reregistered 
from the Lebanese flag to that of the Kingdom of Tonga, but ownership was disputed.247 
Regarding the incident, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, among others, described the 
vessel as a “Ship of Terror” and said that its cargo “would have changed the strategic 
balance.”248 Deputy Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry for Information, 
Gideon Meir, declared that “Israel is actually exercising its most basic security doctrine, 
which is the doctrine of self-defense.”249 Despite the fact that this action lacked 
legitimacy under the law of the sea, it was not condemned by the UNSC,250 probably due 
the combination of Israel’s claims and the vessel’s registry under a flag of convenience, 
which did not bring the issue to the attention of an international legal institution.  
The other Israeli action, although not in a maritime context, is more relevant in 
terms of the nuclear threat and a formal invocation of self-defense. On June 7, 1981, as 
part of Operation Opera, Israeli aircraft destroyed the Osirak nuclear plant in Iraq. Israel 
formally invoked self-defense on the grounds that the plant would be capable of 
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eventually producing nuclear weapons intended for use against Israel, thus posing a grave 
and imminent peril against its existence as a state. Iraq, on the other hand, denied both 
charges of capability and intent, and the issue was addressed to the United Nations in 
order to be resolved.251 The verdict was delivered through the unanimously adopted 
UNSC Resolution 487, which strongly condemned “the military attack by Israel in clear 
violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct,” 
while in parallel calling upon Israel to “refrain in the future from any such acts or threats 
thereof.”252 
Although all of the aforementioned paradigms of anticipatory or pre-emptive self-
defense (the SS Caroline incident, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Operation Noah’s Ark, and 
Operation Opera) have been characterized by success and relative impunity with regard 
to the invoking state, they have nevertheless been viewed merely as the exceptions to the 
general rule that the notions of pre-emption or anticipation do not comprise officially 
recognized attributes of self-defense. This rule was verified by a unanimous UNSC 
Resolution in the case of Operation Opera, when those injured by Israel’s pre-emptive 
attack made an appeal to the former’s jurisdiction. According to the UNSC, self-defense 
may only be invoked in the case of an ongoing or imminent attack or, for the purpose of 
interdicting radioactive materials at sea on board a ship sailing in the vicinity of the 
interdicting state’s waters, heading to one of its homeports, and positively known to be 
transporting a nuclear weapon. As recent experience in Iraq has demonstrated, 
intelligence on these issues has not yet reached the level of credibility required for one 
state to breach another’s sovereignty under the pretext of security or counter-proliferation 
operations. For these reasons, self-defense should only be used as a last resort option.    
7. Creating Rules of Customary International Law  
The last of the probable cause justifications comes from the PSI and the potential 
it presents for creating rules of customary international law for boardings, instead of 
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merely applying such rules. Due to the fairly brief history of the PSI and its controversial 
reception among experts, scholars and states, this proposition involves the greatest degree 
of subjectivity, based largely on predictions alone.  
On one side, Doolin, expressing a general expectation, claims that through the 
cluster of PSI agreements, exercises and interdictions, boarding a vessel suspected of 
carrying WMD materials will gradually evolve into a widely accepted practice.253 Given 
the increasing number of participants254 and maritime exercises, he sees two potential 
paths of evolution that could eventually lead to the amendment of Article 110 of 
UNCLOS: either the overwhelming majority of states that adhere to non-proliferation 
will proceed directly to the amendment of the right of visit; or the gradual proliferation of 
bilateral ship boarding agreements will make maritime interdictions of WMD a common 
practice, eventually incorporating them into the customary law of the sea. Whatever the 
actual case may be, this kind of approach belongs to the sphere of merely desirable, and 
though yet practicable for our contemporary analysis. 
On the other side, Song, taking a more realistic approach, and basing his case on 
the record of previous PSI activities, argues that this prospect is not likely to be realized 
due to the absence of “a general practice of states in undertaking interdictions.”255  PSI is 
an activity and not an organization, reflecting the political commitment of the participant 
states in interdicting radioactive materials at sea and only on an ad hoc basis. Thus, at 
least for the time being, PSI activities do not have any tangible effect on probable cause 
related customary law. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Probable cause for maritime interdictions of illicit radioactive materials has two 
principal aspects: providing a valid reason and evidence for suspicion, as well as 
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justifying the legality of the action under international law. Though these aspects share a 
substantial degree of overlap, it is evident that these currently existing restrictions have 
different origins.  
By definition, “International Law is rooted in acceptance by the nation states 
which constitute the system. Customary law and conventional law are primary sources of 
international law.”256 In the first place, existing legal restrictions are mainly due to the 
lack of political consensus between states in balancing maritime security with freedom of 
navigation (conventional law) and to the absence of common and consistent practices in 
terms of interdicting radioactive materials (customary law). 
Intelligence and surveillance have also demonstrated limitations in their 
applicability and are largely considered to be inadequate to support controversial or last 
resort legal arguments, such as necessity or anticipatory self-defense.  
Nevertheless, the restrictions posed by intelligence and surveillance in 
establishing probable cause could be overcome with the use of portal radiation detection 
monitors. Ongoing developments in this kind of technology present the potential for 
stand-off radiation detection and identification of the materials in question through non-
intrusive means. Furthermore, the data provided by these portals are far less susceptible 
to dispute over credibility than intelligence, while also being publishable in a way that 
does not require the disclosure of any confidential files or sources. Radiation detection 
portal monitors may thus not only contribute to providing valid evidence for suspicion, 
but also to expunging some states’ fear that consenting to a more intrusive UNSC 
resolution (or law of the sea amendment) limiting the flag state’s currently exclusive 
jurisdiction would give grounds for abuse of right by certain states.    
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IV. ENHANCING PROBABLE CAUSE THROUGH 
DEVELOPMENT OF RADIATION DETECTION AND 
IDENTIFICATION TECHNOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Considerable work is ongoing to develop and field radiation detection and 
identification systems for measuring the presence of radioactive materials and for 
determining their identity. One such system that is being actively considered by the U.S. 
government for use in maritime applications is the Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor, or 
ARAM, which was developed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and then 
licensed to IST-Textron Systems. 257 In this thesis, the ARAM system is representative of 
the current state-of-the-art, and its performance has been evaluated to understand the 
potential and limitations of such equipment. 
However, in order for this evaluation to take place the properties of radiation 
detection and identification technology must first be examined. 
1. Forms of Radiation 
The process of radioactive decay is always associated with the emission of 
particles or photons by the decaying atoms. These unstable atoms, during the process of 
transforming into daughter products (i.e., different elements of the periodic table or less 
excited forms of the same isotope), emit a certain combination of alpha particles, beta 
particles, neutrons, gamma rays and X-rays.  Figure 3 illustrates the two most common 
processes of alpha decay and beta decay.   
 
 
                                                 




Figure 3.   Illustration of Radioactive Decay.258 
 
Alpha particles consist of two protons and two neutrons and generally have high 
energy, just as helium nuclei do; however, they can only travel a few inches through air 
and have minimal penetrability through even the least dense solid materials, such as a 
piece of paper or human skin. Beta particles, consisting of a positron or more usually an 
electron, are lighter than their alpha counterparts, but because of their smaller electric 
charge, have longer range and moderate penetrability; they can travel through several feet 
of air (10-20 feet) and it takes a denser material, such as aluminum, to absorb them along 
their path. Gamma and X-rays are not comprised of matter but of highly energetic 
electromagnetic radiation (compared to visible light, radio waves, or other forms of 
electromagnetic radiation). Their most important attribute, however, is a combination of 
the ability to travel long distances and to exhibit a high-penetrating capability; they can 
traverse hundreds of feet in the air and only very dense materials, such as lead or concrete 
of considerable thickness, are impenetrable to them.259 Lastly, neutron radiation by far 
excels all other types of radiation in terms of range and penetrability, since even high 
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atomic number materials do not pose a serious impediment to it. As a result, neutrons can 
best be shielded by materials containing light atoms (e.g., hydrogen), such as concrete 
blocks, water, or other combinations of thick-layered shielding. 
From these descriptions of the characteristic transport and penetration properties 
of various radiation types, which are visually presented in Figure 4, it is evident that for 
the purpose of remote detection and identification of radioactive materials, gamma/X-
rays and neutrons are of primary interest in terms of operational exploitation in the field. 
It should also be noted that the phenomenon of shielding (or, more broadly, the 
attenuation of radiation as it passes through matter), is just one of the four key parameters 
that determine the response of a sensor to a given radioactive source, the other three 
being distance, solid angle of the detector, and time. 
 
Figure 4.   Graphic representation of penetrability for the various forms of radioactivity. 
260 
2. Distance and Radiation Intensity 
Despite the fact that gamma rays and X-rays have longer range than other forms 
of radiation, distance still has a significant negative effect on their detectability. For an 
isotropic radioactive source where S: is the source strength at the origin, I: is the radiation 
intensity and r: is the distance from the source, we have   
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rπ= .  
Therefore, the radiation intensity is inversely proportional to the square of the distance, or 
more simply put, as the distance away from the source doubles, triples, etc., the intensity 
of the remaining radiation that is available for detection subdivides respectively by a 
factor of four, nine, etc. This effect, visually represented in Figure 5, poses a severe 
restriction on the remote detection of radioactive materials.  
 
 
Figure 5.   The effect of distance over radiation intensity.261 
 
The last two factors that determine the response of a sensor to a given radioactive 
source, namely, the solid angle of view and time, will be discussed in sections E.(b) 
Detector Counting Efficiency and E.(c) ARAM theoretical counting rate.   
B. SCINTILLATION DETECTORS 
Regardless of the amount of energy available for detection at a given distance, in 
order for gamma rays or X-rays to actually be detected, their energy must be converted to 
another measurable form, namely an electric current, a chemical change, or a light pulse. 
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The first two forms of measurement offer certain advantages, such as great accuracy and 
great efficiency for low energy X-rays. For more general use, these approaches have 
significant drawbacks, mostly related to technical limitations. A gamma detector, due to 
the distance effect, needs to make maximum use of the photons that reach the detector. 
This can best be accomplished through the use of dense detectors with large volumes. 
Currently, the most efficient detectors satisfying these preconditions are the ones based 
on the scintillation operating principle, i.e., the conversion of gamma ray and X-ray 
energy to a light pulse. Typically, the expected range of these photons lies within the 
energy range of 5 keV to 5 MeV.262 A basic diagram of a scintillation detector, 
corresponding well with the gamma detector configuration used by the ARAM system, is 
shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6.   Gamma detector configuration used by the ARAM system.263  
The use of crystalline sodium iodide (NaI) marked a breakthrough in scintillation 
detection technology as early as 1948, and after six decades NaI is still considered “the 
standard scintillation material,” largely due to its properties of being machinable into a 
broad variety of sizes/shapes, as well as having an excellent light yield.264 This light 
output is in turn converted into an electron flux, i.e. an electric current, by the Photo-
Multiplier Tube (PMT), a type of vacuum tube that also contributes to the detection 
process by proportionally amplifying these current pulses prior to their entry into the next 
stage of the detector, the multi-channel analyzer (MCA). There, the voltage amplitude, 
proportionally corresponding to the gamma ray and X-ray photons’ energies collected by 
                                                 
262 Saint-Gobain Crystals’ Library Technical Information Notes, “Measuring Radiation: An 
Introductory discussion,” Saint-Gobain Crystals’ Library, 2, http://www.detectors.saint-
gobain.com/Media/Documents/S0000000000000001004/SGC_Measuring_Radiation.pdf. 
263 Source: Textron Systems. 
264 Knoll, Radiation detection and measurement, 234-236. 
 










the NaI crystal, is accurately measured and allocated into memory bins. Over time, a 
series of photons is collected, of which, after being converted to current pulses, the total 
counts and energies are stored in the MCA. The final output of the MCA is the so-called 
“spectrum,” a histogram of counts versus energies. This spectrum sets the basis for any 
further computer analysis in order to determine whether the collected data sufficiently 
exceeds background levels to signify the detection of a radioactive material. If this is the 
case, the MCA will further identify the radiation source through analysis of its spectral 
signature, an analysis generally referred to as spectroscopy. 
C. GAMMA/X-RAY INTERACTIONS AND SPECTROSCOPY 
Each radionuclide decays by emitting a specific combination of particles and 
discrete photons. For example, 137Cs emits a 662 keV gamma photon, a 32 keV X-ray 
photon and a beta particle.265 However, alpha and beta particles, due to their weak 
penetrating capability, cannot get through the NaI crystal housing and therefore do not 
have any scintillation effect, even if the detector is very close to the source. X- and 
gamma rays, on the other, produce a measurable spectrum mainly through three 
mechanisms of interaction with matter: photoelectric absorption, Compton scattering, and 
pair production. Generally, for NaI detectors, the photoelectric absorption is the 
“predominant” interaction mechanism for incident photons energies ranging within 0≤ 
Ei≤100 keV. Compton scattering starts having a significant effect on the spectrum (i.e., 
the creation of a Compton continuum in addition to photopeaks), only for gamma photons 
of 100keV energy or more, while pair production effect is negligible for photons below 2 
MeV.266  
                                                 
265 Saint-Gobain Crystals’ Library Technical Information Notes, “Measuring Radiation: An 
Introductory discussion,” 4. 
266 Saint-Gobain Crystals’ Library Technical Information Notes, “Efficiency Calculations for Selected 




Figure 7.   Gamma signature of 137Cs. 267  
1. Photoelectric Absorption 
Figure 7 shows the typical 137Cs spectrum as obtained by ARAM. In this plot, 
photons of energies 662 keV and 32 keV are represented as peaks, or photopeaks. These 
peaks are characteristic of photoelectric absorption resulting from the characteristic 
radiation of 137Cs decay. During the phenomenon of photoelectric absorption, the 
colliding photon passes most of its energy to a single electron, which is then liberated 
from the crystal bond while, in parallel, the original binding energy of the electron is 
transferred to other secondary/lower energy electrons that are also liberated. The sum of 
all these moving electrons produces scintillation light within the NaI crystal. 





                                                 













incident photon is fully absorbed by the crystal. Therefore, the MCA would count only 
discrete energy values (662 keV and 32 keV in the case of 137Cs), giving a spectrum of 
similarly discrete peaks (delta functions).268  
 
Figure 8.   a. Sketch of a photoelectric absorption interaction and b. Graphic distribution 
of the electron energy over a series of similar events (delta function).269 
2. Compton Scattering  
However, the spectrum of Figure 7 consists of more than these photopeaks and its 
apparent complexity is indicative of the presence of other interaction processes. Thus, the 
continuum between 32 and 477 keV is called the Compton continuum and is a result of 
Compton scattering, portrayed in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9.   a. Sketch of a Compton scattering interaction and b. Graphic distribution of 
the electron energy over a series of similar events (Compton continuum).270  
Compton scattering occurs when a gamma ray interacts with an electron in the 
scattering medium (in this case, the NaI crystal), resulting in a scattered gamma ray and a 
recoil electron. By conservation of energy, the energy of the incident gamma photon (Ei) 
is shared, after the interaction, between the scattered photon (Es) and the kinetic energy of 
                                                 
268 Knoll, Radiation detection and measurement, 309; Saint-Gobain Crystals’ Library Technical 
Information Notes, “Measuring Radiation: An Introductory discussion,” 4. 
269 Source: Knoll, Radiation detection and measurement, 309. 




the electron in a way that is dependant on the scattering angle θ.271 This dependence is 
described by the following formula. 
(1.2) s
EE
1 E (1 cos ) / 511
i
i θ= + − , where the Ei, Es units are in keV. 
The case when θ=1800, i.e., when the gamma photon scatters back in the opposite 
direction, coincides with the maximum energy of the scattered photon, which for the 662 
keV incident photon of 137Cs corresponds to Es=477 keV. As shown in Figures 7 and 9b 
this energy marks the end of the Compton continuum and for this reason is called the 
Compton edge. For all other cases of scattering angle 0≤θ<180, the energy of the 
scattered photon being “deposited” into the NaI crystal will range between 32keV≤ 
Es<477 keV thus “drawing” the rest of the Compton continuum.272  
The reason, though that the continuum does not appear to be smooth is due to 
another side effect called back-scattering. When deployed in the field, gamma detectors 
are receptive not only to the intended radioactive sources of interest, but also to the 
abundance of background sources including cosmic radiation and other terrestrial 
radioactive sources that are widespread in nature such as 40K. In order to minimize the 
impact of this ambient radiation noise and optimize the detector’s field of view, gamma 
detectors are surrounded by lead shielding in all directions except the viewing direction 
of the detector. This kind of shielding, and to a lesser degree the overall metal housing of 
the detector and other adjacent materials, may cause a signal in the detector that is similar 
to the Compton scattering of photons, called back-scattering. Some of the photons from 
this back-scattering will eventually end up into the NaI crystal leading, for the case of 
137Cs, to the back-scattering peak near 185keV,273 as represented in Figure 7. A visual 
representation of the back-scattering process is shown in Figure 10.     
                                                 
271 Knoll, Radiation detection and measurement, 310. 
272 Saint-Gobain Crystals’ Library Technical Information Notes, “Measuring Radiation: An 
Introductory discussion,” 4. 
273 Saint-Gobain Crystals’ Library Technical Information Notes, “Measuring Radiation: An 
Introductory discussion,” 4. 
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Figure 10.   Detailed gamma detector configuration and visualization of the various 
gamma photon paths (direct and Compton back-scattering).274 
3. Pair Production 
The last gamma ray interaction with matter is pair production, referring to the 
production of an electron-positron pair (matter-antimatter pair) at the point when a high 
energy incident gamma photon becomes completely absorbed by the NaI crystal. “High” 
energy is understood to be energy above 21022 2 okeV m c= , this being the threshold for 
the creation of an electron-positron pair. When this threshold is exceeded by the incident 
photon, then the surplus of energy is passed onto the pair in the form of kinetic energy 
equal to the energy deposited on the crystal and given by the formula: 
(1.3) 1022kinetic ie eE E E E keV− += + = −  
                                                 
274 Source: Textron Systems. 
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However, the positron is an unstable particle which will eventually collide with an 
electron and annihilate into two equal 511 keV photons, going away from each other in 
opposite directions. Depending on the dimensions of the NaI crystal, none (in the case of 
small detectors), one, or both of these photons (in the case of large detectors) will 
eventually further interact in photopeak absorption or Compton scattering with the 
crystal, thus depositing additional energy and potentially leading to the so-called “single” 
or “double escape peaks.”275 
Although further analysis of these interactions is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
this background is regarded as essential for the evaluation of detector systems such as 
ARAM, since both detection and identification of radioactive sources are based on peak 
identifications algorithms and spectra comparisons.  
D. BACKGROUND NOISE, CALIBRATION, DETECTION, AND 
IDENTIFICATION 
As aforementioned, the omnipresence of terrestrial and cosmic radioactivity 
makes it necessary to define what constitutes “normal activity” (e.g., the radiation field 
that would be expected due to cosmic radiation and naturally occurring radioactive 
materials) at a given location of measurement, in order to detect the real sources of 
interest. This natural activity is defined as the background, a typical depiction of which is 
shown in Figure 11.  
                                                 
275 Knoll, Radiation detection and measurement, 312-317; Saint-Gobain Crystals’ Library Technical 
Information Notes, “Measuring Radiation: An Introductory discussion,” 4. 
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Figure 11.   Typical gamma background spectra.276   
 
Determination of the background spectrum is very important in radiation 
detection. First, it is used as the basis for system calibration. When an unknown source 
needs to be detected, which will always be the case in maritime interdictions, an energy 
point of reference must be established to assure accurate spectrum measurements. This is 
achieved by seeking the photopeaks of known, omnipresent sources and by attributing to 
them the already known energy value. One of the most commonly used is the 
characteristic 1460 keV 40K peak,277 as shown in Figure 11. Apart from this useful 
aspect, though, background noise has primarily negative effects in radiation detection, by 
potentially masking sources of interest especially in the low end of the spectrum. Thus, 
lead shielding of detectors is used to block background radiation as completely as 
possible without interfering with the detector’s desired field of view.  
                                                 
276 This terrestrial background spectrum was measured by the ARAM system at Textron Systems, IST 
Operations facilities in Goleta, near Santa Barbara, CA. Source: Textron Systems. 
277 40K is a ubiquitous naturally occurring radionuclide that has a half-life of 1.28 x 109 years and 
decays by beta decay 89.3% of the time with maximum beta energy of 1.31 MeV and electron capture 









Nevertheless, since background counts cannot be fully eliminated by shielding, 
the remaining background level is subtracted from actual measurements with the use of 
software. The result of this background subtraction is the measured signal above the noise 
and this determines whether or not the source can be detected. With a threshold allowing 
for random, statistical fluctuations of the continuously changing background, any 
remaining difference in counts signifies the presence/detection of a radioactive material. 
Nevertheless, mere detection of the presence of “abnormal” levels of radioactivity is only 
the first step. If there is sufficient information in the signal, it is also possible to 
determine the actual material that is the source of the signal. The difference between the 
measured signal and the background spectrum can be further analyzed by software 
applications that consist of peak search algorithms to identify peaks in the measurement. 
Identified peaks are then compared with a library of spectra representing the full range of 
possible radioactive materials, such as 137Cs whose gamma spectra are shown in Figure 7; 
this process leads to the identification of the radioactive material.  The gamma spectra of 
Figure 12 show a comparison of maritime interdiction signature (black), background 





Figure 12.   Gamma spectra comparison of maritime interdiction signature (black), 
background (red), and library (green).278 
E. EVALUATION OF THE ARAM SYSTEM 
The evaluation of the ARAM gamma detector performance was conducted in two 
ways; first, theoretically, by determining its counting efficiency in a maritime scenario 
and second, by taking measurements in both maritime as well as laboratory 
environments. These measurements were conducted at the Textron Defense Systems 
facilities near Santa Barbara, California, during the period April 16 to April 18, 2008. In 
the following analysis, the operational and performance requirements are in accordance 
with the American National Standard Performance Criteria for Mobile and Transportable 
Radiation Monitors Used for Homeland Security,279 the equations and theoretical set up 
are based on Saint-Gobain Crystals’ Library Technical Information Notes regarding 
                                                 
278 Source: Textron Systems Proprietary, “Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor (ARAM) – A Portal 
Monitor for the Detection of Illicit Nuclear Material,” Textron Systems, March 31, 2008 (Goleta, CA). 
279 American National Standards Institute, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and IEEE 
Xplore. American National Standard Performance Criteria for Mobile and Transportable Radiation 







“Efficiency Calculations for Selected Scintillators,”280 while the relevant Matlab program 
generating theoretical counts is based on data provided by Textron Systems Principal 
Engineer Tom Saunders.281     
1. Operational and Performance Requirements 
Before laying down these requirements, it is necessary to point out that even 
successful completion of the radiation tests described in the relevant ANSI standard, 
“should not be construed as an ability to successfully detect and identify all radionuclides 
in all environments.”282 
For mobile monitors mounted on seagoing vessels, the concept of operations 
requires passes of the monitor in parallel tracks to a stationary source (or vice versa) with 
a speed of 8 km/h (2.24 m/sec) and at a parallax distance of 5 m.283  Although the ANSI 
procedure mentions several different radionuclides to be used for technology 
demonstration trials, due to time and other field constraints, only three sources were 
adequately tested during the actual maritime exercise and only those will be reported 
henceforth; 133Ba, 137Cs and 60Co. The ANSI requirements for unshielded activity of these 
sources (i.e., the required source strength of the unshielded sources) are set respectively 
to 9, 20 and 7 [μCi].284   
2. Lake Cachuma Test 
In order to evaluate the performance of ARAM in a water environment, a test was 
conducted on Lake Cachuma, California, on April 18, 2008. This test was a mid-stage 
appraisal by Textron Systems with the purpose of optimizing the system prior to its 
participation in the extensive testing program called “Crawdad.” “Crawdad” was 
                                                 
280 Saint-Gobain Crystals’ Library Technical Information Notes, “Efficiency Calculations for Selected 
Scintillators.” 
281 Tom Saunders, e-mail message to author, May 12, 2008. 
282 American National Standards Institute, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and IEEE 
Xplore. American National Standard Performance Criteria for Mobile and Transportable Radiation 
Monitors Used for Homeland Security, 1. 
283 Ibid., 12-13, 26-27. 
284 Ibid., 20. 
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launched during the summer of 2008 by the Savannah River National Laboratory; it 
involves the testing of radiation detectors mounted on maritime platforms and is closely 
related to the Department of Homeland Security's Small Vessel Security Strategy 
(SVSS).285 The purpose of this strategy is “to reduce potential security and safety risks 
from small vessels
 
through the adoption and implementation of a coherent system of 
regimes, awareness, and security operations that strike the proper balance between 
fundamental freedoms, adequate security, and continued economic stability.”286 The term 
“small vessel” refers to a craft with displacement of 300 gross tons or less,287 but nothing 
restricts the use of the relevant technology and means to vessels of greater tonnage. In 
such a case, the only impediments would be relevant to the decreased performance of the 
system due to the aggravated effects of distance and shielding, proportionate to the 
increased dimensions (distance) and multitude of compartments (shielding).  According 
to testing program manager Matthew Graviss,288 the strategic objective of “Crawdad” is 
to promote probable cause in maritime interdictions involving illicit nuclear and other 
radiological materials and prevent these materials from reaching the U.S., hence the 
objectives of “Crawdad” are highly pertinent to the scope of this thesis. 
a. Test 
The test at Lake Cachuma was conducted with two leisure boats, hereafter 
referred to as the sensor and target vessels, respectively. The ARAM configuration used 
consisted of two gamma detectors (2¨x4¨x16¨ in size) and one neutron detector (36¨ 3He 
tube) firmly placed in parallel with the sensor vessel’s longitudinal axis as visualized in 
Figure 13. A detail not included in Figure 13, due to lack of three-dimensional 
perspective, is that the target vessel had a lower freeboard than the sensor one, meaning 
                                                 
285 Haley Hughes, “Crawdad testing helps with radiation detection,” aikenstandard.com, August 14, 
2008, http://www.aikenstandard.com/0814SRS.  
286 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Small Vessel Security Strategy,” U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security Library, April 2008, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-
strategy.pdf, 1. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Rob Pavey, “Boat-mounted radiation detectors being tested at Savannah River Site: Tool against 
terrorists,” Online Athens Banner-Herald, August 13, 2008, 
http://onlineathens.com/stories/081408/news_2008081400393.shtml.  
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that sensor and source had a vertical parallax separation of about 0.2m. The neutron 
detector, though properly connected to verify proper communication/operation, was not 
tested due to lack of a neutron emitter. In addition, the two gamma detectors were from 
two different suppliers, Alpha Spectra, Inc. Scintillation Detectors and Saint-Gobain 
Crystals, both using similar technology and a core of sodium iodide (NaI) crystal, but 
with different housings: 0.8mm of aluminum for the Alpha detector, versus 1mm of steel 
for the Saint-Gobain one. 
During the test, the target boat remained virtually stopped (there was a 
slight drifting motion due to wind and current) while the sensor vessel conducted passes 
in parallel tracks and at various distances. During each pass the sensor boat’s speed was 
kept fairly low at about 2 mph and between each pass the boat would recede to adequate 
distance in order not to let the test sources interfere with ARAM’s detected background 
and become part of it (because of its small dwell time), which would  result in reduced 
sensitivity. Also, to reduce background, the measurements were taken at locations with 
depths ranging from 130 to 140 ft and distances ranging from 200 to 400 m from the 
nearest shore. Nevertheless, background potassium levels remained at almost half of the 
respective terrestrial levels representing 500 to 700 counts per second.  
b. Detector Counting Efficiency 
Given the distance effect, propagation attenuation factors, and the 
complexity of interactions taking place inside the detector, only a small portion of the 
gamma rays emitted by a radioactive source will eventually produce a count in the 
system. The detector counting efficiency (DE) expresses exactly a theoretical calculation 
of this portion. The detector efficiency is very important in terms of performance 
evaluation because, as will be demonstrated, it can thereafter easily give the expected 
counting rate for a given source in a known geometry of transitory measurements, and 



















Figure 13.   Boat Configuration For the Lake Cachuma Test.  
 
DE is given by the formula 
(1.4) * *DE G I M= , where 
G: is the geometrical solid angle factor or in other words “the fraction of 
all space that the detector subtends.”289 All space means the “area of sphere with a radius 
equal to the source detector distance.”290 It is evident that in any real world scenario 
G<<1.  
I: is the propagation attenuation factor. During the propagation of gamma 
rays from the radioactive source to the actual NaI crystal, there are several intermediate 
materials, the presence of which, due to absorption or scattering, inflicts additional losses 
above those due to the distance effect. Thus, the I factor represents the fraction of the 
source-emitted photons that will eventually reach the scintillation crystal. Some of the 
                                                 
289 Saint-Gobain Crystals’ Library Technical Information Notes, “Efficiency Calculations for Selected 
Scintillators,” 3. 











typical intermediate materials along the ray path include the source’s shielding, the 
atmospheric air, and the housing of the detector.  
The general form of I to reflect attenuation caused by more than one 
material would be: 
(1.5) 1 2 3* * *...I I I I=  
Every elementary Ii is given by the formula: 
(1.6) * idiI e ι
μ−= , where 
μi: is the attenuation coefficient of the respective material and  
di: is the distance traveled through it by the gamma photons. 
M: is the “fraction of the photons absorbed by the detector.”  
As previously described, gamma ray interactions with matter are fairly 
complicated and dependant to a large extent on the dimensions of the NaI crystal; the 
greater the dimensions, the greater the probability that a photon will interact with the 
crystal, deposit its energy, and give a count, instead of escaping undetected.     
c. ARAM Theoretical Counting Rate for American National 
Standard Transitory Measurements Geometry 
Assuming that “all photons are traversing the same amount of detector 
material,”291 the area that each detector subtends relative to the source can be 
approximated by the face area S of the detector, which is  
(1.7) 24"*16" 0.04129S m= =   
Therefore, one can define the theoretical counting rate, G, by 
(1.8)         24
SG
dπ= , where d: is the distance between the source and the 
detector.  
                                                 
291 Saint-Gobain Crystals’ Library Technical Information Notes, “Efficiency Calculations for Selected 
Scintillators,” 4. 
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However, due to the transitory measurements geometry, d is not fixed, but 
a function of time. If z is the vertical axis, x is the sensor boat axis of motion and y is their 
complimentary axis, then: 
(1.9) 0 *x x v t= + , 5y = and 0.2z = and   
(1.10) 2 2 2 ( )d x y z f t= + + =  
Regarding the calculation of the propagation attenuation factor I, the 
sources were not shielded, thus the only coefficients to be used are: 
(1.11) 3 0.4148 11.3*10 *air E cmγμ − − −= : attenuation coefficient of air. 
(1.12) 0.5249 15.97*Al E cmγμ − −= : attenuation coefficient of the aluminum housing for the 
Alpha Spectra detector. 
(1.13) 0.8933 1225.16*Fe E cmγμ − −= : attenuation coefficient of stainless steel housing for the 
Saint-Gobain detector. 
All these attenuation coefficients are dependant upon the respective 
gamma photons’ energies Eγ for each radioactive source, while the distances travelled 
within each medium are dair=d, dAl=0.8mm and dFe=1mm.  
Last, the NaI crystal absorption efficiency M is given by: 
(1.14) 
42.69*10 *0.9869* EM e γ
−−=  
With the detector efficiency DE known, the expected number of counts P 
is given by the product:  
(1.15) *P DE N= , where 
(1.16) * *N TB T A= , and 
TB: is the total branching ratio referring to a specific mode of decay and 
then on to a specific photon energy for that mode. Branching ratios are “the probabilities 
of various de-excitation transitions;”292 e.g., there is an 85% probability that the excited 
nuclei of 137Cs will emit a 662 keV gamma photon during its transition to the daughter 
product of 137Ba. On the other hand, the decay scheme of 60Co consists of a beta particle 
emission followed, at 99.97% of the time, by an 1173 keV gamma ray to a still excited 
 
 
                                                 
292 Knoll, Radiation detection and measurement, 11. 
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state, and then by a 1332 keV gamma photon with a similarly high branching ratio of 
almost 100%.293 The decay schemes of both the aforementioned sources are portrayed in 
Figure 14. 
T: “the total counting time interval;” 
A: the activity of the radioactive source expressed in disintegrations per 
second (dps); and  





Figure 14.   Decay schemes of 60Co and 137Cs. 294 
Due to the complexity and multitude of these calculations, a Matlab 
program was constructed to extract the expected number of counts P, making use of the 
theoretical equations set up above, as well as the activities, gamma photon energies, and 




                                                 
293 Knoll, Radiation detection and measurement, 11. 
294 Source: Knoll, Radiation detection and measurement, 11. 
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133Ba 9 80.99 25 276.4 5.6 302.85 14.3 356.01 48.1 383.85 6.9 
137Cs 16 661.66 84.62         
60Co 7 1173.24 99.97 1332.5 99.98       
 
Table 3 demonstrates the results of the Matlab program. Due to the 
different housing of the Alpha Spectra and Saint-Gobain detectors, their outcomes are 
shown separately, while a third column gives their sum of counts, representing the 
anticipated performance of the ARAM system as a whole.  
Table 3.   Theoretical counting rate of each detector and ARAM as a whole in relation to the 
various test sources. 




133Ba 9 189.2 159.2 348 
137Cs 16 279.2 263.5 543 
60Co 7 254.1 246.2 500 
The validity of these theoretical results was then tested with the field 
measurements taken at Lake Cachuma. The measurements, however, were taken at 
various distances, in order to check the system limits in detection and identification for 
sources of different activities than the nominal ones in the ANSI N42.43-2006 and for a 
passing speed of 2 mph. Nevertheless, by means of averaging distances and in order to 
maintain a common reference of analysis, field measurements were subsequently reduced 
to the prompt standardization requirements, as shown in Table 4. 
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137Cs 18.5 16 11416 457 395 158 109 543 
60Co 4.7 7 10687 427 636 254 123 500 
Note: The bracketed factors in the Ba-133 row demonstrate how the respective counts were derived from the 
previous column. Similarly for the other two sources.  
 
At this point it should also be noted that, apart from the aforementioned 
industrial isotopes, test measurements were also taken for source materials, namely 232Th 
and 238U. However, in an e-mail message to the author on April 30, 2008, Textron 
Systems Principal Engineer Tom Saunders commented that an analysis similar to the 
above of the 232Th and 238U test cases could not be performed because their activity was 
not known and a more complex theoretical set-up was required. The ability of ARAM to 
detect and identify the most important category of potentially illicit radionuclides 
according to the classification described in Chapter II, Special Nuclear Materials, was not 
included in these tests.  
Despite the fact that such ability is regarded as “the most critical task for a 
spectroscopic portal monitor,” actual testing is largely unfeasible due to the strict 
regulatory control over the materials in question and subsequent limited access to them. 
Credible prediction models to test the peak identification algorithms used by ARAM can 
however be attained with statistical analysis. A Monte-Carlo study has shown that 232Th, 
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HEU, 238U,295 and 239Pu all have approximately the same difficulty of identification.296  
The counts required for proper identification (i.e. 90% confidence accuracy over 1000 
test runs) at maritime background levels are 750. The same study showed that the 
industrial isotopes of 137Cs and 133Ba can effectively mask low detection levels of HEU 
and WGPu  (weapons grade plutonium) respectively. More specifically, the 185 keV 
back-scattering peak of 137Cs may interfere with the peak identification algorithms due to 
its close proximity to the 235U photopeak of 186 keV. Overall, “the identification 
accuracy of HEU was degraded as the level of  137Cs increased,”297 with similar effects 
being expected for the combination of 133Ba and WGPU. The ARAM used peak search 
algorithms that were less susceptible to this kind of masking than their other significant 
counterpart of spectral template matching.298   
d. Conclusions-Recommendations for Lake Cachuma Test 
(1) Due to the thinner and less dense material housing (0.5mm of 
aluminium versus 1mm of stainless steel), the Alpha Spectra detectors’ performance was 
better than their Saint-Gobain counterparts. Thus, the housing of the detector along its 
field of view sides should have the lowest attenuation coefficient possible, by using only 
thin layers of non-dense materials. 
 
                                                 
295 Uranium ore consists mainly of 238U and to a far lesser extent, 235U. The process used to increase 
the amount of 235U relative to 238U is known as uranium enrichment. “U.S. civilian power plants typically 
use 3 to 5% 235U. Weapons use highly enriched uranium (HEU) with over 90 percent 235U. Some research 
reactors and all U.S. naval reactors also use HEU.” See Institute for Energy and Environmental Research 
Publications, “Uranium: Its Uses and Hazards,” Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, 
http://www.ieer.org/fctsheet/uranium.html.  
296 Saunders, “Spectroscopic portal identification of special nuclear materials,” 1209-1211. 
297 Ibid. 
298 Saunders, “Spectroscopic portal identification of special nuclear materials,” 1209-1211. 
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(2) ARAM was initially developed for use in the terrestrial environment 
with fixed check-points of commercial traffic.299 As a result, a number of its software 
and hardware configuration settings needed to be modified to meet the requirements of 
maritime application. 
(a) Matlab theoretical values indicated that an event should be 
generated by the test conditions since 350 to 500 counts would be expected to be 
generated by a pass at 5 mph.  This expectation was not verified by the Lake Cachuma 
tests for 137Cs and 60Co. It was clear as a result that the Sequential Probability Ratio Test 
(SPRT) B value should be lowered.300  
(b) During the test, there were also an unusually high number of 
suppressed events, indicating that the detection threshold set within the ARAM systems 
may have been too high.  The usual threshold values are based on terrestrial background 
and it is likely that this need for adjustment was a result of the lower background rates 
encountered in the maritime environment.  
(c) Detection and identification may be improved by optimizing 
the lead shield configuration.  Once again, the current configuration is optimized for 
terrestrial radiation, not maritime radiation.  
(d) Last, in order to achieve 750 counts, corresponding to 90% 
identification accuracy, of 232Th, HEU, 238U, and 239Pu will require at least three 
detectors.   
                                                 
299 “ARAM has been deployed by the State of California since December 2004, scanning over 8,000 
commercial trucks per day at the state’s border crossings to protect against incoming dirty bombs and other 
radiological weapons of mass destruction.” Source: Textron Systems Proprietary, “Adaptable Radiation 
Area Monitor (ARAM) – A Portal Monitor for the Detection of Illicit Nuclear Material,” Textron Systems, 
March 31, 2008 (Goleta, CA). 
300 The Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) is one of the “statistical tests applied to make a 
trigger determination. […] It is a Bayesian technique that provides added sensitivity over the traditional 
single-interval test (SIT). SPRT is able to reliably detect sources travelling at a much wider range of speeds 
than SIT. It also provides an “all clear” indicator as soon as SPRT is able to determine with sufficient 
confidence that the radiation in view is within acceptable limits from the background level.” Source: 
Textron Systems Proprietary, “Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor (ARAM) – A Portal Monitor for the 
Detection of Illicit Nuclear Material,” Textron Systems, March 31, 2008 (Goleta, CA).  
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F. LAB MEASUREMENTS 
In addition to the field test on Lake Cachuma, several test measurements were 
taken in the lab, mainly for 137Cs and 232Th. The activities of both sources used were 
similar to each other and approximately 10 measurements were taken at each distance; 
more measurements were taken at greater distances in order to extract safer conclusions 
concerning the range limits in detection and identification of each source. Background 
noise level fluctuated between 1225 and 1430 cps, far greater than the levels observed on 
Lake Cachuma. The ARAM performance was also proportionally degraded, despite the 
fact that this time the geometry was fixed (both detector and source were stationary). The 






























































































Figure 16.   ARAM performance during lab measurements for 232Th. 
 
From these diagrams, two qualitative conclusions can be extracted. At first glance 
it is obvious that though the number of counts generated at the portal may suffice to 
acquire a detection event, this is not always the case for identification too. The 
confidence level of the latter measurement seems to “lag” five to ten percent behind the 
one of detection throughout most tested ranges. This is to be expected since detection 
should be easier than identification in virtually every situation. 
The second conclusion is that radionuclides that have their characteristic peaks 
concentrated at the lower end of the spectrum are harder to detect at greater distances. 
This conclusion could also be theoretically anticipated if the equations (1.11) to (1.13) 
were correlated with the library spectra of 137Cs (Figure 7) and 232Th (Figure 16). The 240 
keV peak of 232Th,  contributing the overwhelming majority of photons that will most 
probably generate counts for detection (due to photoelectric absorption, when photons 
fully deposit their energy to the NaI crystal) and being the most characteristic for 
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identification by the peak search algorithms, is at the same time more susceptible to 
propagation losses. (Lower gamma energies Eγ bring on greater attenuation coefficients 
μi). This is why ARAM’ s performance figures for 137Cs are  degraded in terms of 




Figure 17.   Gamma signature of 232Th.301   
Similar results could also be expected for 235U, for which the two characteristic 
peaks reflect the emission of low energy gamma rays at approximately 98 keV and 186 
keV. These photons present limited penetrability though most common materials, and 
therefore make uranium detection more difficult and more susceptible to shielding. More 
specifically, even a relative comparison of the shielding effect between these two gamma 
rays is revealing. A study has shown that while the presence of 5 mm steel shielding 
reduces “the 186 keV intensity by a factor of two, it reduces the 98 keV line by a factor 
of four.”302 
                                                 
301 Source: Textron Systems. 
302 K. J. Hofstetter et al, “Uranium detection using small scintillators in a maritime environment,” 







G. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF ARAM  
According to one source, the ARAM system technology, comprised of 
“proprietary algorithms, software and hardware initially developed by the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory” and then licensed to IST-Textron Systems has all but 
exhausted its potential.303 On the contrary, it continues to be developed through the 
cooperation of the partners above, as well as relevant third party institutions such as the 
Savannah River National Laboratory. Its sophisticated combination of hardware 
configuration and identification algorithms has proved a competent capability to detect 
and identify a wide spectrum of sources. Thus, ARAM is able to distinguish “innocent,” 
naturally occurring radioactive materials from hazardous medical and industrial isotopes, 
possibly illicit and intended for RDDs. It can also detect special fissile and source 
materials, which are definitely of proliferation concern and may be used for nuclear 
explosive devices or at least improvised ones.  
However, as detailed in the relevant ANSI N42.43-2006 standard, even successful 
completion of all the radiation tests described in it, “should not be construed as an ability 
to successfully detect and identify all radionuclides in all environments.”304 Prompt 
detection and identification depends, among other factors, on the source level of 
radiation, the shielding (whether intentionally surrounding the source or, in the case of a 
merchant vessel, merely intermediate in the form of machinery, cargo, and bulkheads), 
and on the distance between the source and the sensor. In real maritime interdictions, one 
does not usually have control over any of these crucial parameters.  
Maritime interdictions offer de facto some optimistic prospects regarding 
ARAM’s performance. The levels of radiation to be looked for in a real interdiction 
scenario can be expected to exceed by large margins the few μCi represented in the ANSI 
standard. The sensor-carrying Rigid-hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) will be able to approach 
the target vessel as close as a few meters without interfering with its navigational safety 
                                                 
303 Berkeley Nucleonics Corporation, “Radiation Portal,” Berkeley Nucleonics Corporation, 
http://www.berkeleynucleonics.com/radiationportal.html.  
304 American National Standards Institute, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and IEEE 
Xplore. American National Standard Performance Criteria for Mobile and Transportable Radiation 
Monitors Used for Homeland Security, 1. 
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or mare liberum rights. Also, the low level of maritime signal to background noise ratio 
greatly ameliorates the probability of detection of even comparatively weak signals, such 
as the ones of HEU, “at reasonable distances.”305 Distance and shielding over an illicit 
radioactive source hidden amidst the machinery room of a 200,000 tons vessel will likely 
counterbalance these advantages and mask the presence of the source, however. 
With the results of “Crawdad” still unavailable, Rudy Goetzman, Savannah River 
National Laboratory's program manager, roughly outlined them in a recent statement, 
given on August 13, 2008: “Although range and sensitivity will vary, the detectors under 
development will be useful in seeking out - and also defining - nuclear materials from 
afar. […] It will be sensitive enough to not only see and detect radiation sources, but also 
detect particular components of the source - the exact isotope.”306 Hence, ARAM can 
significantly contribute to enhancing probable cause for maritime interdictions involving 
illicit nuclear materials. Even a harsh judge of ARAM’s efficacy cannot overlook the fact 
that – apart from the cases when the system cannot provide detection (in which the 
suspect vessel would in any case go un-interdicted unless existing approaches were 
enough to establish probable cause) – in all other cases in which ambivalent intelligence 
or surveillance data create doubt for the decision maker, a correlation with credible 
spectral analysis data, indicating the presence of a radioactive source not declared in the 
ship’s manifest and/or during the “hailing” procedure, automatically clarifies the 
situation.  
In the course of these investigations, the author was able to perform theoretical 
and field experimental evaluations of the process of remote detection of radionuclides 
under maritime conditions using ARAM, a well-recognized state of the art detection 
technology. Based on these technical evaluations and an understanding of the legal and 
institutional issues related to probable cause determination, it is clear that such 
technology offers great promise in promoting effective interdiction operations that will 
improve safety and reduce the risk of illicit transport of radioactive materials. 
                                                 
305 K. J. Hofstetter et al, “Uranium detection using small scintillators in a maritime environment,” 
438.  
306 Rob Pavey, “Boat-mounted radiation detectors being tested at Savannah River Site: Tool against 
terrorists,” Online Athens Banner-Herald, August 13, 2008, 
http://onlineathens.com/stories/081408/news_2008081400393.shtml.  
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V. CONCLUSION – NO PANACEA 
Post-Cold War and September 11, 2001, developments have increased nuclear 
proliferation and nuclear terrorism as the most prominent security threats to the 
international community. For these reasons, and those addressed above, the maritime 
domain is pre-eminent in ensuring this security, especially through interdictions 
involving illicit radioactive materials. However, in order for these interdictions to be 
feasible, the issue of properly establishing probable cause must be resolved first. This 
issue represents a unique overlap of policy and technical considerations, an overlap that 
inevitably leads to the conclusion that there is no panacea. Instead, a constructive 
promotion of establishing probable cause requires a cohesive course of action, making 
use of both political means and technical information.  
Probable cause includes both legal justification and reason for suspicion. 
Regarding the first component, the prospect of an enhanced UNSC resolution emerges as 
the most prudent solution, offering numerous advantages compared with the other 
potential alternatives described in Chapter III. First and foremost, it is based on 
amendment, and not reinterpretation, of international law. Reinterpretation, advocated by 
other proposed doctrines such as self-help, necessity, or anticipatory self-defence, 
contributes to the erosion of established international law and order and leads to an 
international society more prone to anarchy. These grave risks have been pointed out in 
relevant scholarship, with a widespread consensus on assessing reinterpretation 
approaches only as a last resort. Second, the alternative of amending international law 
through a new convention on the law of the sea could take decades-long negotiations, 
similar to those that preceded the one currently in force (UNCLOS III), which started on 
1973, ended in 1982, and entered into force in 1994. Third, even if the amending process 
was opted for and implemented, it would only be binding on the states that ratified it. 
This is a serious drawback, since states of proliferation concern, like North Korea, would 
almost certainly not ratify it and hence would not be bound by its provisions. On the 
other hand, under Chapter VII and Article 25 of the UN Charter, enforcement actions, 
such as maritime interdictions, against any perceived threat to the international peace and 
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security can be authorized by the UNSC, and are legally binding to all states regardless. 
Moreover, under Article 103 of the UN Charter, a UNSC resolution “prevails over other 
entitlements in international law.”307 Still, the prospect of such a resolution remains 
unlikely for as long as the policy concerns that resulted in the limited entitlement of 
UNSC Resolution 1540 remain.  
Nevertheless, these policy concerns in respect to policing the oceans without 
disrupting legitimate navigation could be overcome with coordinated and parallel efforts 
in both operational and policy/legal fields. In the operational field, the key lies in the 
correlation of:  
i. intelligence information; 
ii. surveillance observations; and  
iii. radiation detection/identification data. 
Arguably, such correlation can promote probable cause in two respects. The first, 
being less normative and more realistic, is that even within the existing, highly restrictive 
legal framework, a compilation of all these resources would signify that last resort 
options such as self-help, necessity, or anticipatory self-defense could be more 
thoroughly justified and invoked. For example, a relevant hypothetical scenario could be 
set by the following conditions: first, an initial suspicion set up after an intelligence tip 
that a foreign-flagged vessel bound to one of the interdicting state’s ports is carrying 
illicit radioactive materials; second, the cargo declaration of the suspect vessel provided 
during its “hailing” does not match with the detected presence of a radioactive material; 
third, there is no pretext under the law of the sea to board the vessel; and fourth, upon the 
request of the interdicting state to board the suspect vessel, there is a negative or no 
response on behalf of the flag state. In such a case, all available legal non-intrusive means 
would have been exhausted and the interdicting state would have solid grounds to board 
the vessel on the high seas even without the consent of the flag state, by invoking one of 
the aforementioned doctrines.  
                                                 
307 Klein, “Legal Limitations on Ensuring Australia’s Maritime Security,” 334.  
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The second involves probable cause enhancement based on the same concept of 
operations, but this time projected with normative means. Given that the international 
community has repeatedly affirmed that nuclear terrorism and proliferation are threats to 
its security in numerous UN resolutions, a new UNSC resolution on the policing of the 
oceans against radioactive materials could be enacted by setting mutually accepted rules 
of engagement (ROE). Rules of engagement are used by military and law enforcement 
agencies all over the world in order to determine when, where, how, and against whom 
force will be applied. ROE reflect the intentions of the political leadership308 and can be 
tight or loose in their application. Existing practices of establishing probable cause 
through intelligence and surveillance are susceptible to a large extent to interpretation, 
manipulation, and lack of credibility. Therefore, they are not adequate by themselves to 
set tight ROE for maritime interdictions on the high seas, a precondition that seems 
indispensable in order to overcome some states’ reluctance to consent to a UNSC 
resolution criminalizing the illicit transport of radioactive materials. This reluctance, 
reinforced by the states’ fear of relinquishing sovereignty rights (expressed in the form of 
the exclusive flag state jurisdiction) and potential abuse of right resulting in harassment 
of legitimate shipping,309 can only be overcome by establishing tight ROE that will ease 
this fear and ensure the least possible interference with the mare liberum principle. In this 
respect, adding the precondition that any intelligence-based evidence of suspicion must 
be correlated with “hailing” and radiation spectroscopy data can safeguard to a significant 
degree tight ROE and non-abusive maritime interdictions.  
Moreover, regarding the policy/legal field, further promotion of probable cause 
would require cooperation in: 
i. Intelligence Sharing;  
ii. Technology Funding and Sharing; and 
iii. Balancing Sovereignty, Interests, and Security.  
                                                 
308 In Western standards through the Political Policy Indicators (PPI). See also 
www.army.dnd.ca/lfaa_hq/arcon06/Annexes/Tact%20Instr%20F%20ROE.doc. 
309 Klein, “Legal Limitations on Ensuring Australia’s Maritime Security,” 337.  
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Despite the fact that “poor intelligence estimates of Iraq’s WMD program 
enhance distrust for … intelligence services and challenge the credibility of future … 
intelligence assessments,”310 intelligence should by no means be totally discounted as an 
option. One should not forget that in the vastness of the oceans and the multitude of ships 
sailing them, only two sources of establishing initial suspicion and exercising the right of 
approach exist; either an intelligence tip or the transit of a commercial vessel through a 
warship’s patrolling area. Therefore, intelligence sharing should be implemented by 
either strengthening existing structures or creating new complementary ones.  In this 
respect, the dissemination of information among NATO members and PfP partners by 
CC-MAR Naples or the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit,311 as well as among the PSI 
partners as part of the Statement of Interdiction Principles, is a step in the right direction.  
As crucial as the sharing of intelligence is the sharing of technology. None of the 
ARAM related arguments made above will have any real and practical impact on the 
framework governing maritime interdiction operations, unless the relevant technology is 
shared and funded for further development. This kind of sharing, due to its less sensitive 
nature compared with intelligence, should not only be limited within the narrowly drawn 
limits of alliances (such as the Programme of Work for Defence against Terrorism312), 
but expanded to a much wider spectrum.  In that direction, the much less controversial, in 
relation to the PSI, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism may prove very 
constructive. Though, according to Woolf, Kerr, and Nikitin, the Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism faces constraints, such as lack of funding and consequent 
                                                 
310 Warden, “Overcoming Challenges to the Proliferation Security Initiative,” 81. 
311 Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit is a permanent and not an ad hoc body for intelligence sharing 
established right after the September 11, 2001 attacks. See also Dagmar de Mora-Figueroa, “NATO’s 
Response to Terrorism,” NATO Review (Autumn 2005), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/art1.html.  
312 “This Programme was launched by NATO's National Armaments Directors, who formally meet 
twice a year in a group known as the Conference of National Armaments Directors or CNAD, and is aimed 
at leveraging national expertise and research programmes to develop new and improved technologies to 
combat terrorism.” See Marshall Billingslea, “Military Matters-Combating Terrorism Through 
Technology,” NATO Review (Autumn 2004), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue3/english/military.html.  
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skepticism on the part of the U.S. Congress,313 it nonetheless constitutes a “flexible 
framework” to “prevent illicit trafficking by improving detection of such [nuclear] 
material.”314 This framework also includes common exercises and sharing of doctrines, 
operational information, and technology via expert-level workshops.315 316 
Lastly, it is important to point out that the adoption of a resolution that would 
grant states the de jure right of combating nuclear proliferation on the high seas similar to 
the already vested right of combating piracy and the slave trade317 is overwhelmingly a 
matter of politics and to a far lesser extent a matter of all the other parameters, such as 
operational doctrines, intelligence, or physics applications. Currently, only part of the 
international community shares the same concern and urgency regarding the “need to re-
balance states’ interests to enhance maritime security,”318 despite the widespread 
consensus on the threats posed by nuclear terrorism and proliferation.  Nevertheless, this 
kind of reconsideration on behalf of political leadership in balancing sovereignty, 
interests, and security is crucial unless the international community is willing to “wait for 
a seaborne WMD attack by terrorists before putting pen to paper.”319 
In the words of the Head of the Planning Section in NATO's Operations Division, 
Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “Few security issues in the years ahead are likely to attract as 
much political attention as maritime security, due to its cross-cutting nature, straddling 
issues of international security, sovereignty, energy assurance, economic prosperity, law 
enforcement and defense.[….] [M]aritime security is one of the defining security 
                                                 
313 Amy F. Woolf et al., “Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and 
Agreements,” 34. 
314 Ibid. 
315 U.S. Department of State. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, “Terms of Reference for 
Implementation and Assessment,” http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/76421.htm. 
316 “The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Union (EU) have observer status. 
As of December 2007, 64 states have agreed to the statement of principles and are Global Initiative partner 
nations.” See Amy F. Woolf et al., “Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and 
Agreements,” 33. 
317 Persbo and Davis, “Sailing Into Uncharted Waters? The Proliferation Security Initiative and the 
Law of the Sea,” 75. 
318 Klein, “Legal Limitations on Ensuring Australia’s Maritime Security,” 334-337.  
319 Doolin, “The Proliferation Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm,” 51. 
 100
challenges of this century.”320 Arguably though, these contemporary conditions regarding 
maritime security are not without precedent. The issues of the slave trade and 
piracy/privateering in the 19th century were equally controversial and cross-cutting in 
nature,321 as well as widely accepted state practices at the time. Nevertheless, the mere 
fact that they were ultimately addressed via consensus among all states and codified 
under the law of the sea as two of the formally enumerated reasons justifying the right of 
visit on the high seas, generates solid grounds for anticipating that combating illicit 
trafficking of radioactive materials will eventually obtain a similar status in the years to 
come.  
                                                 
320 Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “New operational horizons: NATO and maritime security,” NATO Review 
(Winter  2007), http://www.otan.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue4/english/analysis4.html.  
321 On one hand, the slave trade involved not only humanitarian issues, but also fears that “its 
abolition would […] wreck the economy or merely benefit foreigners who would step into the market.” 
(See William Anthony Hay, “The Slave Trade's Great Enemy,” Wall Street Journal, July 25, 2008, Eastern 
Edition.) On the other, piracy and its state-sponsored version, privateering, distinguished from one another 
only by the issuance of a letter of marque, involved to an even greater extent all of these issues, from 
international security to law enforcement and defense.    
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